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1.
We show the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing. If the entrant is technologically inferior to the incumbent, foreign entry increases domestic welfare for intermediate (sufficiently large) technological differences between the firms under licensing with fixed fee (output royalty). If the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent, foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed‐fee licensing and royalty licensing. 相似文献
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We show the implications of strengthening patent protection in a developing country in the presence of a vertical technology transfer, which, despite its empirical relevance, did not get due attention in the literature. We show that if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, a strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the developed‐country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. However, if there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or discriminatory tax policy in the developing country, the profits of the developed‐country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing countries. 相似文献
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It has been argued that a monopolist input supplier may find it profitable to create an outside source for its input if it reduces product price and attracts buyers ( Farrell and Gallini, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103 (1988) , pp. 673–694). We consider a monopolist input supplier's incentive for outsourcing and R&D. We show that even if outsourcing can attract new buyers, it is not beneficial to the input supplier if either the existing final goods market is not very concentrated or cost reduction through R&D is sufficiently large. We further show that while R&D may be preferable to the input supplier, outsourcing may be socially desirable, and thus may create a conflict of interest between the input supplier and the society for R&D and outsourcing. 相似文献
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Abstract. In this paper we study a two-person firm consisting of a principal and an agent. The principal hires the agent to provide some input into the production process. The output of the production process is determined by the agent's input and an exogenous state realization. Subsequent to joining the firm, but prior to choosing his input, the agent privately observes the state realization. The principal employs an imperfect monitoring system that publicly reports on the state realization. Our purpose in studying this model is to better understand the effects of monitoring on the design of the optimal employment contract and the determinants of the value of monitoring in a model with asymmetric information. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient une entreprise constituée de deux personnes, un mandant et un mandataire. Le mandant embauche le mandataire pour sa contribution au processus de fabrication. Le résultat du processus de fabrication est déterminé par la contribution du mandataire et par la réalisation d'un état exogène. Après s'être joint à l'entreprise, mais avant de déterminer quelle sera sa contribution, le mandataire observe, en privé, la réalisation de cet état exogène. Le mandant a recours à un système de suivi imparfait qui fait le point, à l'intention du public, sur la réalisation de l'état en question. L'étude de ce modèle permet une meilleure compréhension des conséquences du suivi sur la nature de contrat d'emploi optimal et des déterminants de la valeur du suivi dans un modèle caractérisé par une information asymétrique. 相似文献
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We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for anticompetitive entry regulation due to the standard excess‐entry result may not be justified in the presence of licensing. However, if the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry costs where entry does not occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition. 相似文献
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We consider the plant location decision of a multinational company (MNC), which has the option to invest in technologically differentiated countries. We show that the MNC's investment decision depends on the market structure of the host countries and on the possibility of exporting by the host‐country firms. We also show that a conflict of interest does not necessarily arise between the plant location decision of the MNC and the preferences of the host countries. 相似文献
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We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring market entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces domestic welfare if both the profit extraction and cost saving from outsourcing are sufficiently small. 相似文献
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We examine the relationship between government partisanship, interest rates and the mean and volatility of stock prices in the United States and United Kingdom. We suggest that traders in the stock market rationally expect higher (lower) post-electoral interest rates during the incumbency of the left-wing (right-wing) party – Democrats and Labor (Republican and Conservative) – and in election years when they expect the left-wing (right-wing) party to win elections. We hypothesize that expectations of higher (lower) interest rates decrease (increase) the mean and volatility of stock prices during the actual incumbency or even anticipation of a left-wing (right-wing) party holding the office of the chief executive. Results from empirical models estimated on data from U.S. and U.K. markets over most of the twentieth century statistically support our claims. 相似文献
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中国和印度的农村工业化比较研究 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
在过去几十年里,中国农村的非农经济取得了举世瞩目的高速增长,对中国经济的整体增长做出了积极贡献。而在印度,该部门的表现却大为逊色,无论产出还是就业都增长缓慢。本文从两国制度性及政策差异(特别是在政治制度、所有权结构、信贷制度)来分析两国农村非农业部门出现不同的发展模式的原因。通过中印两国农村非农业经济的优劣势的回顾,我们可以更清楚地看到该部门增长的潜力与挑战。 相似文献