Ethical Decision Making in Marketing: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Scales Measuring the Various Components of Decision Making in Ethical Situations

The authors present a comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the published scales measuring the components of the decision making process in ethical situations using the Hunt-Vitell (1993) theory of ethics as a framework to guide the research. Suggestions for future scale development are also provided.     

Organizational culture in public accounting: Size, technology, rank, and functional area

This study examines the nature of organizational culture in public accounting and demonstrates that different aspects of culture exist across and within public accounting firms. Organizational culture is defined in terms of values shared by members of an organization (or organizational sub-unit) that manifest themselves in the practices of that organization. Practices particularly important to the development and maintenance of culture include selection and socialization. The hypotheses state that different aspects of organizational culture vary across public accounting firms of different size and technology, and public accountants of different rank and functional area. These hypotheses are tested and largely supported with responses to a paper and pencil instrument, the Values Survey Module (Hofstede, Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation, 1982), which was completed by 338 public accountants across the United States. Implications for accountants and future research are also discussed.     

Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize the mechanisms that maximize revenue for some well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations.     

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Summary For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.I am very grateful to Karl Iorio with whom I derived most of the results in this paper. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. I am also grateful to Robert Anderson, Debra Aron, Eddie Dekel, Raymond Deneckere, Michael Kirscheneiter, Steven Matthews, Roger Myerson, Daniel Vincent and Robert Weber for comments on previous drafts of this paper.     

Oil risk contracts,business conduct and performance patterns: Data panel analysis

Using the economic and financial performance data of international companies for the exploration, and exploration–extraction (E&E) of oil, as well as the patterns of institutional situation and orientation with the government market and national oil companies or NOCs that receive project offers, we analyze the institutional development and behavior patterns by type of E&E contract, following the strategic actor approach, or the so-called agency theory. Additionally, in light of Mexico's energy reform being implemented between 2015 and 2019, we analyzed the types of license contracts compared to those for production and shared profit. Subsequently, it was determined-through panel data methods in the analysis of 17 companies between 2005 and 2015-that global companies present bigger yields and commitments compared to specialized companies, confirmed by their net income and returns on equity or ROE.     

Multi-product capacitated facility location problem with general production and building costs

This research introduces the multi-product capacitated facility location problem with general production and building costs (MP-CFLPGC). The MP-CFLPGC extends previous problems found in the literature by including multiple products and general production and building cost functions that allow the modeling of different behaviors like economies of scale and congestion. The MP-CFLPGC is formulated as a mixed integer linear program (MILP). To evaluate the performance of the proposed formulation we analyze the results of a commercial optimizer on a set of 288 randomly generated test instances that resemble the Colombian cement industry supply chain. After one hour the optimizer achieved an optimality gap of 1.0 % or less in 55 % out of the 288 test instances. On average the optimality gap was 3.57 %. Additionally, we propose a randomized mathematical-programming-based heuristic for the test instances where the MILP formulation presents significantly high optimality gaps.     

Structural shocks and dynamic elasticities in a long memory model of the US gasoline retail market

A structural multivariate long memory model of the US gasoline market is employed to disentangle structural shocks and to estimate the own-price elasticity of gasoline demand. Our main empirical findings are: (1) there is strong evidence of nonstationarity and mean reversion in the real price of gasoline and in gasoline consumption; (2) accounting for the degree of persistence present in the data is essential to assess the responses of these two variables to structural shocks; (3) the contributions of the different supply and demand shocks to fluctuations in the gasoline market vary across frequency ranges; and (4) long memory makes available an interesting range of convergent possibilities for gasoline demand elasticities. Our estimates suggest that after a change in prices, consumers undertake a few measures to reduce consumption in the short- and medium-run but are reluctant to implement major changes in their consumption habits.     

When is escalation of commitment unstoppable in group settings? An iterative economic modeling approach to unveil the dark side of group decision-making

Escalation of commitment (EOC) has been usually studied from a psychological lens, and only recently have scholars approached EOC from an economic perspective. We contribute to this by focusing on iterative decision-making in group settings with a game theory approach. We study how the group members' strategic interaction may result in continuing failing courses of action. Drawing on the Byzantine generals' problem, our model considers an iterative decision-making process where committee participants vote based on private information to escalate or not. Our article demonstrates that if decision-makers reset their beliefs based on the committee's previous decision, then EOC becomes perpetual.