CORRUPTION AND MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES: DOES REGULATION HELP?

Misunderstandings about the structure of microcredit interest rates continue to generate rich criticism of the industry's high interest rates. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and, more recently, on macroeconomic and macro‐institutional factors. While the cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors also matter. In addition to other important results that usually validate the empirical literature, this paper finds that microcredit interest rates respond positively to corruption. The analysis shows that there is asymmetry between the effects of corruption, depending on whether or not the MFIs are regulated. While corruption has a positive and significant impact on interest rates of unregulated MFIs, it has a negligible impact on interest rates of regulated MFIs.     

Stochastic Frontier Estimation of Market Power in the Food Industries

We use a modified version of the stochastic frontier model to estimate oligopoly markups above the perfectly competitive frontier, separating out deterministic markups from purely stochastic markups. Using data from 42 US food processing industries between 1990 and 2010, empirical results indicate a widespread incidence of oligopoly power, with Lerner indexes averaging approximately 21%. Further, the estimated markups increase with industrial concentration but decrease with price elasticities and imports. Finally, the estimated Lerner indexes are in the range of previous food industry estimates using New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) models.     

Differential efficiency,market structure and price

A persistent question in industrial economics is the underpinning of the link between market concentration and price. How much of the link can be attributed to market power and how much to market efficiency? This paper develops a theoretical model to address that question. Applied to the US portland cement industry, the model indicates that both impacts matter. In relative terms, however, the market power effect is twice as large as the efficiency effect. An implication for merger policy is that the beneficial efficiency effects of mergers may not be obtained without the detrimental market power effects as well.     

Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act

This paper analyzes the market and welfare effects of the United States Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act enacted in 2001. The act mandates meat packers to report their transactions daily to a government agency and requires the agency to make a summary of those transactions available to the public through the Mandatory Livestock Meat Market News Reports. Considering the case of an imperfect packer cartel that uses trigger price strategies, this paper examines the impact of market information provided by the reports on equilibrium livestock slaughter and the welfare of the groups involved and identifies the determinants of the socially optimal level of information. A key result of the paper is that, even when facilitating collusion among packers, increased market information can be social welfare enhancing.     

TESTING OLIGOPOLISTIC AND OLIGOPSONISTIC BEHAVIOUR: AN APPLICATION TO THE US MEAT-PACKING INDUSTRY

This paper extends the conjectural approach in industrial organisation to the analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets. Starting from the specification of a production function, the econometric analysis is based on the formulation and estimation of a simultaneous-equation model consisting of a production function, first-order conditions associated with factor employment, and two conjectural elasticities to parameterise the industry's oligopoly and oligopsony equilibria. As an example, we provide an application to the US meat-packing industry. Our results suggest that the industry exercises market power in both the output (meat) market and the factor (live animal) market.     

Measuring market power in multi-product oligopolies: the US meat industry

This paper develops and estimates an economic model for measuring market power in a quantity-setting oligopoly engaged in the joint production of demand-related goods. The model, which allows for firms' conjectures about both same and cross-market responses to own output variation, is applied to the US meat (beef and pork) industry. He hypothesis that the industry's equilibrium reflects price taking behaviour is rejected. The hypothesis of no cross effects cannot be rejected. Roughly, half of the farm-to-retail price spreads for beef and pork appear to be attributable to market power.     

Imperfect Competition and Total Factor Productivity Growth

This article examines the role of imperfect competition in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG) by bringing together a New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) model and the TFPG model of Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1999). Application of the integrated model to 1973–1992 data from 29 food processing industries revealed that, overall, changes in markups, economies of scale, and demand growth contributed positively to TFPG while the disembodied technical change was a negative contributor. Furthermore, the factors underlying the TFPG estimates are interactive and their net effects are starkly different from the conventional Solow (1957) residual TFPG measures, underscoring the need to account for imperfect competition, returns to scale, and demand growth in analyses of this type.     

Measuring Price Effects of Concentration in Mixed Oligopoly: An Application to the Swedish Beef-slaughter Industry

Empirical studies of market power focus exclusively on industries with private firms. Yet, it is not uncommon to find private firms competing with public firms or cooperatives (coops) within the same market. We develop an empirical procedure for measuring market-power and cost-efficiency effects of concentration in mixed oligopoly consisting of coops and investment-owned firms (IOF) and apply the procedure to the Swedish beef-slaughter industry. We find that the cost-efficiency effect of coop concentration more than offset its market power effect, resulting lower beef prices. IOFs are found to be price-takers in both cattle procurement and beef sales.      

Measuring Market Power and Cost-efficiency Effects of Industrial Concentration

In this paper I show how Appelbaum's framework for testing price-taking behavior in a single industry can be formally extended to consider concentration explicitly. In so doing, I separate the market power effect of concentration from its cost-efficiency effect. Data from the US beef-packing industry are used to illustrate an empirical application of the model. The findings support oligopsonistic market power and slaughter-cost efficiency in the industry. However, the cost-efficiency effect outweighs the market-power effect.     

Market Power and/or Efficiency: A Structural Approach

This article separates oligopoly-power and cost-efficiency effects ofchanges in industrial concentration and assesses their impact on output prices in 32 food-processing industries. Empirical results indicate that although concentration inducescost efficiency in one-third of the industries, oligopoly-power effects either dominate cost efficiencyor reinforce inefficiency, resulting in higher output prices in most industries. The articlealso provides fresh econometric estimates of oligopoly power and economies of size for the industriesin question.