Credit claiming

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who work in a team. The public observes the organization’s performance, but not the separate contribution of the leader or of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.JEL Classification: M5Björn Segendorff gratefully acknowledge financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR, F0357/97). We are also grateful for comments by an anonymous referee.     

A note on the independence of irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

The purpose of this note is to show that there is no necessary relationship between the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property and stochastic independence of the errors in probabilistic choice models.     

Motivating Through Delegating Tasks or Giving Attention

An important role of managers is to motivate subordinates. Monetaryrewards have been the focus of economic analysis. Managers alsouse other means to influence subordinates. If a manager canbetter assess the subordinate's ability than the subordinatehimself, and if ability and effort are complements, the managerfinds it hard not to overstate a junior's ability. Talk is cheap.We analyze under what conditions a manager can use organizationalpractices such as delegation and the selective provision ofattention to credibly communicate his assessment. We comparetheir desirability. Delegation is preferable in case the manager'sassessment is fairly accurate; attention is inescapable if itis inaccurate.     

Chinese Walls in German Banks*

Analysts in a bank’s research department cover firms that have no relationship with the bank as well as companies in which the bank has a strategic interest. Officially, banks must establish Chinese Walls around their research departments to allow the analysts to work independently and to avoid the flow of insider information. We examine analyst behavior under long-term bank-firm relationships using ownership data and analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for German companies from 1994 to 2001. We find evidence that is consistent with analysts reconciling their employers’ interests with their own career concerns. They seem to use their information advantage strategically by releasing favorable and thereby more precise reports when the market underestimates earnings. In order not to jeopardize the bank-client relationship, they suppress negative information when the market is too optimistic. Combining situations where the market over- and underestimates earnings, we can replicate the unconditional positive bias in analyst forecasts found in the previous literature. Despite the bias in affiliated analysts’ forecasts, they nonetheless selectively communicate valuable information to investors. *We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data. This data has been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research. We thankfully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) under the Jubil?umsfonds grant number 8523. We thank Werner Antweiler, Michael Halling, Helmut Elsinger, Evelyn Hayden, Greg Hebb, Cornelia Kullmann, Kai Li, Colin Mayer, Stefan Pichler, Duane Seppi, Alex Stomper, Neal Stoghton, Michael Stutzer, Suresh Sundaresan, Yishay Yafeh, Josef Zechner, Christine Zulehner, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at UBC, the Northern Finance Association meetings, the Western Finance Association meetings, and the European Finance Association meetings for helpful comments and Eva Smolen for excellent research assistance.     

Firm heterogeneity, productivity and spatially bounded knowledge externalities

In this paper, we argue that conceptually disentangling the ‘context versus composition’ aspects of regional growth is a multilevel issue. By applying multilevel models (also called random-effects models), we show (1) the importance of considering firm-specific characteristics simultaneously with region-specific characteristics, as we find that a large part of what is traditionally assigned to the impact of the region should be assigned to firm-specific characteristics and (2) that existing single-level methodologies can be problematic, as they are vulnerable to the charge of estimating significance levels that are too liberally assigned and promote exaggerations. This is illustrated empirically by showing that single-level approaches would lead to the conclusion that innovation spillovers are highly significant in a setting of Dutch urban growth differentials, while multilevel analyses shows less liberally assigned significance levels. We conclude that multilevel-effect models better fit research questions that combine firm and spatial characteristics simultaneously, especially because they allow firm-specific characteristics to be differently linked to their regional contexts.     

The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees

Workers' rewards and career perspectives often depend on how their supervisors perceive their performance. However, evaluating a worker's performance is often difficult. We develop a model in which a worker is uncertain about his own performance and about his supervisor's ability to assess him. The supervisor gives the worker a performance appraisal aiming to affect both the worker's self‐perception and his own credibility in assessing the performance. We examine how performance appraisals affect the worker's future performance. Our model's predictions are consistent with empirical findings. Supervisors give, on average, “too” positive appraisals, and both positive and negative feedback can (de)motivate workers.     

Governing the Palm-Oil Sector through Finance: The Changing Roles of the Indonesian State

By analysing the different roles of the Indonesian state in arranging finance schemes for palm-oil development since 1945, this article aims to answer two questions: What are these roles? And to what extent have they prioritised or balanced economic growth, social equity, and environmental protection? We conclude that the state has never been absent from the palm-oil industry but has had different and changing financing roles that are historically contingent and shaped by the evolving economic and political landscape. Furthermore, these roles reflect Indonesia’s priorities of achieving economic growth through palm-oil development, furthering social equity, and, recently, promoting environmental sustainability.