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Patrick DeGraba 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2013,31(5):516-526
Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it. 相似文献
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DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) show that the seller of a durable input can solve the time inconsistency problem by offering most-favored-customer (MFC) protection to buyers. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that if a supplier sells inputs to competing firms using two-part tariffs, MFC protection that allows a firm to replace its contract with a contract executed by any other firm will not solve the commitment problem, and argue this implies managers cannot use MFCs as a strategic commitment device in complex contracting situations. This paper shows that if the profits of the seller and the buyers are monotonic in each term of the contract, then applying MFC protection to each term of a contract allows a manager to solve his commitment problem in complex contacting situations. We show that "standard" contract arrangements (two-part tariffs, declining block tariffs, and royalties as a percentage of sales) meet this condition. 相似文献
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This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists. 相似文献
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Patrick DeGraba 《Economic Theory》1995,5(1):181-188
Summary We present a technique for locating both an upper and a lower bound on equilibrium points of supermodular games by looking only at the first derivatives of the payoff functions at points of disequilibrium. This technique is useful for characterizing equilibria of games when the closed form solution is difficult to calculate, for performing comparative statics analysis, and for determining the uniqueness of equilibria.I would like to thank David Easley, James Friedman, Ken Kasa, Rich McLean and Michael Waldman for their helpful comments. 相似文献
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Jonathan B. Baker Mark Bykowsky Patrick DeGraba Paul LaFontaine Eric Ralph William Sharkey 《Review of Industrial Organization》2011,39(4):297-309
The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online
markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly
referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal
affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent
competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline. 相似文献
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Baker Allison Brogan Patrick DeGraba Patrick Dempsey Judith Janson Michael LaFontaine Paul Li Cher Makuch Kim Matraves Catherine Stancill Martha Stockdale Donald Woroch Glenn 《Review of Industrial Organization》2021,59(4):599-627
Review of Industrial Organization - The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal... 相似文献
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