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Summary LetT denote a continuous time horizon and {G
t
:tT} be a net (generalized sequence) of Bayesian games. We show that: (i) if {x
t
: tT} is a net of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategies for Gt we can extract a subsequence which converges to a limit full information BNE strategy for a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, (ii) If {x
t
: tT} is a net of approximate or t-BNE strategies for the game Gt we can still extract a subsequence which converges to the one shot limit full information equilibrium BNE strategy, (iii) Given a limit full information BNE strategy of a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, we can find a net of t-BNE strategies {x
t
: tT} in {G
t
:tT} which converges to the limit full information BNE strategy of the one shot game.We wish to thank Larry Blume, Mark Feldman, Jim Jordan, Charlie Kahn, Stefan Krasa, Gregory Michalopoulos, Wayne Shafer, Bart Taub, and Anne Villamil for several useful discussions. The financial support of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Campus Research Board is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
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Let
be a sequence of differential information economies, converging to a limit differential information economy
(written as
). Denote by
the set of all ε-private core allocations, ε ≥ 0 (for ε=0 we get the private core of Yannelis (1991), denoted by
). Under appropriate conditions, we prove the following stability results
JEL Classification Numbers D82, D50, D83, C62, C71, D46, D61Most of this work was done in Spring 2001, when Balder held a visiting professorship at the University of Illinois. Presentations based on this paper were given by Balder at the Midwestern Theory Conference in Madison, Wisconsin (May, 2001) and at the SAET Conference in Ischia, Italy (June, 2001). 相似文献
(1) | (upper semicontinuity): if , , and if f k → f ∞ L 1-weakly, then . |
(2) | (lower semicontinuity): if , , ε > 0, then there exist , with f k → f ∞ L 1-weakly. |
5.
Maria Gabriella Graziano Claudia Meo Nicholas C. Yannelis 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2020,22(5):1481-1514
We introduce externalities into the classical model by Shapley and Scarf; that is, agents care about others and their preferences are defined over allocations rather than over single indivisible goods. After collecting some results about the nonexistence of several cooperative solutions, we focus on stable allocations and propose domains of preferences that can guarantee that they both exist and form a stable set à la von Neumann and Morgenstern. 相似文献
6.
We examine the rise in student loan defaults in the Great Recession by linking administrative student loan data at the individual borrower level to student loan borrowers’ individual tax records. A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition shows that shifts in the composition of student loan borrowers and the massive collapse in home prices during the Great Recession can each account for approximately 30% of the rise in student loan defaults. Falling home prices affect student loan defaults by impairing individuals’ labor earnings, especially for low income jobs. By contrast, when comparing the default sensitivities of homeowners and renters, we find no evidence that falling home prices affect student loan defaults through a home equity-based liquidity channel. The Income Based Repayment (IBR) program introduced by the federal government in the wake of the Great Recession reduced both student loan defaults and their sensitivity to home price fluctuations, thus providing student loan borrowers with valuable insurance against negative shocks. 相似文献
7.
Under the Bayesian–Walrasian Equilibrium (BWE) (see Balder and Yannelis, 2009), agents form price estimates based on their own private information, and in terms of those prices they can formulate estimated budget sets. Then, based on his/her own private information, each agent maximizes interim expected utility subject to his/her own estimated budget set. From the imprecision due to the price estimation it follows that the resulting equilibrium allocation may not clear the markets for every state of nature, i.e., exact feasibility of allocations may not occur. This paper shows that if the economy is repeated from period to period and agents refine their private information by observing the past BWE, then in the limit all agents will obtain the same information and market clearing will be reached. The converse is also true. The analysis provides a new way of looking at the asymmetric equilibrium which has a statistical foundation. 相似文献
8.
Nicholas C. Yannelis 《Economic Theory》2009,38(2):419-432
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information
and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis
and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect
on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is
achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265,
1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003).
To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion,
comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck.
A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap. 相似文献
9.
In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie
setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also
not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791,
2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium
market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal),
which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments,
random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new
concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating
and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework
agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian
estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case
of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an
ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular,
we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist.
This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois. 相似文献
10.
Natalie Bachas Olivia S. Kim Constantine Yannelis 《Journal of Financial Economics》2021,139(3):872-894
The efficiency of federal lending guarantees depends on whether guarantees increase lending supply or simply act as a subsidy to lenders. We use notches in the guarantee rate schedule for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans to estimate the elasticity of bank lending volume to loan guarantees. We show significant bunching in the loan distribution on the side of the size threshold that carries a more generous loan guarantee. The excess mass implies that increasing guarantee generosity by one percentage point of loan principal would increase per-loan lending volume by $19,000. Excess mass increases in periods with guarantee generosity, and placebo results indicate that the effect disappears when the guarantee notch is eliminated. 相似文献