Collective Bargaining, Macroeconomic Performance, and the Sectoral Composition of Trade Unions

Strong exposed-sector unions and weak public-sector unions are seen as having beneficial effects on macroeconomic performance. Although these effects must work through the bargaining structure, the interaction with union composition is unclarified. This paper argues that the interaction effect qualitatively differs with the bargaining type. The findings show that the performance of pattern bargaining significantly increases with growing exposed-sector union strength whereas uncoordinated bargaining and centrally coordinated bargaining do not interact with union composition.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

Tragedy of the Commons in a Stochastic Game of a Stock Externality

This paper investigates a tragedy of the commons where an Ito‐process traces the accumulation of pollution and differentiates between reversible (i.e., clean up is feasible) and irreversible emissions (past pollution cannot be undone). The reversible case allows for an explicit analytical solution, while other means are necessary to characterize irreversible outcomes. More precisely, a different characterization of equilibria (in Markov strategies) as smooth connections between an initial and a stopping manifold is suggested.     

Firm‐ and Individual‐Level Determinants of Balanced Scorecard Usage*/DÉTERMINANTS DE L'USAGE DU TABLEAU DE BORD ÉQUILIBRÉ AU DOUBLE ÉCHELON ORGANISATIONNEL ET INDIVIDUEL

The factors influencing the organizational as well as the individual decision to utilize the balanced scorecard (BSC) approach have not been widely researched. In the first part of this paper, we study BSC adoption at the organizational level while utilizing a multifaceted perspective of socio‐psychological, economic, and resource‐based influences; specifically, we investigate the perceptions of desirability, urgency, and feasibility of BSC adoption. Our findings show that customer norms, competitor norms, and organizational resources are significant predictors of BSC adoption. In the second part of the paper, we discuss individual‐level aspects of utilization decisions. Here, we explore the impact of perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, and awareness on the intentions to use the BSC approach. Our findings show that both awareness of BSC capabilities and perceived ease of use are significantly related to perceived usefulness. However, only perceived usefulness is significantly related to intentions to use the BSC. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement

Although legal sanctions are often nondeterrent, we frequently observe compliance with “mild laws.” A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. Mild laws nevertheless give scope for a potentially large, positive welfare effect, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower social enforcement costs.     

INVESTMENT OPTIONS AND BARGAINING POWER: THE EURASIAN SUPPLY CHAIN FOR NATURAL GAS*

We use cooperative game theory to analyze the power structure in the pipeline network for Russian gas. If the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system, the main transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, appear to be strong. Once investment options are accounted for, Russia achieves clear dominance. Competition between transit countries is of little strategic relevance compared to Russia's direct access to its customers. Comparing our theoretical results with empirical evidence, we find that the Shapley value explains the power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus.     

Egg on the Face of Government

A classical example of the cost of government intervention is the fiasco in egg production induced by the Danish Government's prohibition of battery production. Franz Jessen describes the costs and confusion and warns other counties not to repeat Denmark's mistakes.