One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft

The Department of Justice recent case against Microsoft is that it should not be allowed to aggressively maintain control over the internet browser market with the objective of preventing the internet from becoming the platform that could ultimately destroy Microsoft's operating system market. The aim of this paper is not to attack the Department of Justice case. Rather, it is to argue that for consumers one monopoly dominating both the operating system and applications is better than two separate monopolies. In our model we integrate Cournot's theory of two goods that are jointly used in the production of a third composite good with the fixed-proportion model. Utilizing our model we develop a possible explanation for Microsoft's actions – protection of its monopoly profits in the operating systems package market. Additionally we show that the price of the final product is lower if one firm monopolizes all markets. Consequently, the ordered split-up of Microsoft by Judge Thomas P. Jackson, aiming at creating two separate companies, one that will produce the windows and the other the operating systems, will harm consumers.     

The Aggregate Relation between Profits and Concentration is Consistent with Cournot Behavior

An important and controversial stylized fact inindustrial organization is the positive correlationbetween industry profit and concentration. Oneinterpretation of this finding is based on thetheories of Chamberlin and Stigler, which imply thatconcentrated industries facilitate collusion. Butnon-cooperative profit maximizing behavior can alsogenerate a positive correlation. This paperpresents an equilibrium model of oligopoly whichnests the behavioral assumptions of Bertrand,Cournot, and Chamberlin. Simulations of the modelunder the Cournot assumption yield regressioncoefficients for the profits-concentration relationthat are very close to the estimated coefficients inthe literature.