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Jason Heyes 《英国劳资关系杂志》1996,34(3):351-369
Managerial strategies designed to elicit greater employee commitment in production have received much attention in recent industrial relations reseach. Training is seen to form a core component of such strategies, yielding such beneficial outcomes as improved efficiency and employee motivation. Yet the connections between training strategy and performance outcomes have been treated in an overly simplistic fashion. This in turn reflects a lack of empirical inquiry at the level of the shop-floor currently to be found in the subject area. By integrating an investigation of the workplace into the analysis of management strategy and performance outcomes, it is possible to develop a deeper understanding of the linkages between training provision, commitment and systems of reward. 相似文献
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Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy. 相似文献
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Anthony G. Heyes 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1996,10(1):81-98
Regulatory agencies are often legally obliged to use a cost-benefit rule in revising environmental standards to reflect improvements in pollution-control techniques, but have considerable discretion over the timing of such revision. How should the agency use this discretion? Longer lags tend to encourage more intense R&;D effort by the regulated industry itself whilst discouraging parallel effort by external developers. Optimal implementation lags are characterized. The analysis calls into question the conventional view that “footdragging” by agencies is necessarily evidence of incompetence or regulatory capture. More generally, whether or not subject to conscious manipulation by regulatory agencies, the delays routinely observed in implementation may enhance welfare. 相似文献
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We identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits. The adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect (i) the speed of improvement of abatement technologies; (ii) the direction (in a sense to be defined) of that improvement; (iii) its source and the distribution of the rents from it; and (iv) the rate of development of defensive (averting) technologies. Existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model, several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned. The message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost–benefit balancing should be done with care. 相似文献
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There is substantial research and policy interest in the relationship between firms and the natural environment, including how this relationship is influenced by regulators, international pressures, rival firms and stakeholder demands. With some exceptions, the ‘softer’ dimensions of environmental aspect management – how attitudes, beliefs and perceptions and the human factors drive corporate behaviour – have been understudied. The work that exists tends to be informal, and allows little scope for the statistical validation that is required for robust inference. This paper examines whether corporate values towards the environment affect a firm's environmental performance. It uses survey methods as well as content and discourse analyses of interview text and corporate reports and web sites to explore the links between managerial ‘mindsets’ and the environmental performance of the firms of which they are a part. Though the application is Argentina, the lessons learned can be generalized to other developing and industrialized countries. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. 相似文献
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We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. In particular, while the EPA will typically have the tools for detecting misbehaviour, the NGO can influence the intensity of social hostility directed towards those found to have misbehaved. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles’s (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74(2):361–366, 1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own. 相似文献
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Anthony Heyes 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2001,19(3):257-266
In the context of many environmental hazards there is scope for self-defence by victims. Multiple equilibria arise in a model of bilateral precaution under a regime of strict but incompletely enforced environmental liability. This means that the same system of environmental law instigated in two economies may lead to very different outcomes. It impacts upon policy analysis in a variety of ways and provides a channel for ``cultural factors' to matter. We explore the positive and normative effects of subsidising self-defence. 相似文献
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Journal of Regulatory Economics - 相似文献