Co-movement in Stock Prices in Emerging Economies: The Case of the Caricom Region

The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 recognised the need for financial integration within the emerging economies that comprise the CARICOM region, as a way of furthering the wider process of economic integration and, indeed, economic development in that region. Using co-movement as a measure of financial integration, this paper investigates the co-movement in stock prices among the Barbados, the Jamaica and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchanges, the three major exchanges within the CARICOM region. It also examines how integrated these exchanges are with the New York Stock Exchange. The GARCH-Copula methodology and, to a lesser extent, estimated correlation coefficients, are used to attain this objective. There appears to be co-movement in stock prices and returns within the CARICOM stock markets and significant dependence structures between the returns of the three CARICOM stock markets. However, there is considerably less evidence of integration between the CARICOM markets and the New York Stock Exchange.     

The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

A Paleoeconomic Theory of Co-Evolution and Extinction of Domesticable Animals

One Pleistocene mystery is why early North Americans eradicated their large, potentially domesticable animals (e.g., horses), whereas early Europeans did not. A commonly‐held hypothesis is that European species were evasive due to co‐evolution with hominids, whereas North American animals were naïve and unable to adapt quickly enough when experienced human hunters arrived from Eurasia. We explore this hypothesis with a paleoeconomic model of co‐evolution that integrates human hunting investments and wildlife population responses. We find that investments in hunting ability, based on the relative scarcity of prey species, could have mattered more than wildlife ‘naivety’ in explaining the extinction.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences

A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.     

The divide-and-conquer and employer/ employee models of discrimination: Neoclassical competition as a familial defect

This article is an examination of the similarities between Michael Reich’s divide-and-conquer model of discrimination and the Becker-Arrow taste model of discrimination. It shows that Reich’s model of discrimination is analytically identical to Arrow’s employer discrimination model when employer utility is a function of total profits and the racial employment ratio. It also shows that the Becker-Arrow distinction between employer and employee discrimination is invalid. Finally, the author argues that neoclassical competition is the major defect of both models. After discussing the implications of these results the article points to new directions in the literature on the economics of discrimination.     

Profit maximization: The ethical mandate of business

The authors propose a model for business ethics which arises directly from business practice. This model is based on a behavioral definition of the economic theory of profit maximization and situates business ethics within opportunity costs. Within that context, they argue that good business and good ethics are synonymous, that ethics is at the heart and center of business, that profits and ethics are intrinsically related.Marist Father Pat Primeaux is a Professor of Theology at Saint John's University, (New York). John Stieber is a Professor of Finance and Economics at Southern Methodist University's Edwin L. Cox School of Business (Dallas). They have collaborated on several articles on the behavioral dimension of economic efficiency. They have also designed and taught courses in business ethics at both the graduate and undergraduate level.     

Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

Large Non-Union Companies: How Do They Avoid a Catch 22?

Large non-union companies might be expected to enjoy extensive work-force flexibility deriving from their high-wage, high-involvement strategies. However, where there is a strong local union presence, this might be expected to exert a strong dampening effect on the levels of internal flexibility achieved. Such companies, fearful of union organization, could not then enjoy the freedoms that might be associated with a non-union strategy. Research conducted in the Republic of Ireland on large non-union US companies operating in the electronics industry suggests a conceptual framework indicating how a Catch-22 situation is avoided in these companies.