Economic integration and corruption

We study the link between corruption and economic integration. Integration is modeled by a common regulation for public procurement. We show that integration resolves a term of trade driven prisoner's dilemma and will always take place in the absence of corruption. Corruption may destroy the incentives for integration. If the propensities to corruption are too different, the more honest country, which benefits less from integration, will not be willing to join the union. This difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency. We also show that integration has the positive effect of reducing corruption.     

Recruitment,Training, and Career Concerns

We examine training and recruitment policies in a two‐period model that nests two forms of production, “routine” work where ability and effort are substitutes and “creative” work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. Although teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite effect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation.     

Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms’ incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms’ information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect.     

Allocating Ideas: Horizontal Competition in Tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in tournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares not only about the quality of the design but also about the design location. A priori not even the sponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discovered once he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficient firm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location. Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost difference between contestants can be neither too small nor too big. Therefore, if the sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in the tournaments by the two lowest-cost contestants cannot be optimal for the sponsor.     

Beyond R&D activities: the determinants of firms’ absorptive capacity explaining the access to scientific institutes in low–medium-tech contexts

A firm's search strategy is to use innovation inputs from external sources such as suppliers, clients, competitors, universities and research transfer offices (RTOs) to complement their in-house knowledge. Thus, a firm needs to be capable of identifying and valuing the potential value of certain external knowledge, i.e. absorptive capacity. Most of the studies regarding search patterns are reduced mostly to medium–high- and high-tech industries in which only the level of investment in R&D activities as determinant of a firm's search strategy is considered. In addition, when the flows of external knowledge arise from firm–university interactions, the evidence is still inconclusive, specifically for SMEs and low–medium-tech environments. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to explore the pattern of a firm's search strategy through its absorptive capacity to acquire external flows of knowledge from universities and RTOs. The paper draws especially on the role of non-R&D innovation activities in low–medium-tech sectors. Seven hundred and forty three innovative firms from the Spanish Ministry of Industry are analysed. Results suggest that human resources and other non-R&D activities are the core drivers explaining the cooperation agreements to access external knowledge from universities and RTOs. Surprisingly, R&D expenditures do not contribute to the explanation. This paper presents important implications for policy-makers beyond the classic R&D policies.     

Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts

This paper analyses the problem of abnormally low tenders in the procurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financial situation to bid more aggressively than financially healthy firms in the procurement auction. Therefore, it is likely that the winning firm is a firm in financial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper focuses on the regulatory practice of surety bonds to face this problem. We show that the use of surety bonds reduces and sometimes eliminates the problem of abnormally low tenders. We provide a characterization of the optimal surety bond and show that the U.S. practice of requiring that surety bonds cover over 100% of the contract price can be excessive, implying overinsurance to the problem of abnormally low tenders.     

The Struggle for a Voice: Tensions between Associations and Citizens in Participatory Budgeting

The emergence of new participatory mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting, in towns and cities in recent years has given rise to a conflict between the old protagonists of local participation and the new citizens invited to participate. These mechanisms offer a logic of collective action different from what has been the usual fare in cities — one based on proposal rather than demand. As a result, urban social movements need to transform their own dynamics in order to make room for a new political subject (the citizenry and the non‐organized participant) and to act upon a stage where deliberative dynamics now apply. This article aims to analyse this conflict in three different cities that set up participatory budgeting at different times: Porto Alegre, Cordova and Paris. The associations in the three cities took up a position against the new participatory mechanisms and demanded a bigger role in the political arena. Through a piece of ethnographic research, we shall see that the responses of the agents involved (politicians, associations and citizens) in the three cities share some arguments, although the conflict was resolved differently in each of them. The article concludes with reflections on the consequences this conflict could have for contemporary political theory, especially with respect to the role of associations in the processes of democratization and the setting forth of a new way of doing politics by means of deliberative procedures.     

Deployment of high-speed broadband infrastructures during the economic crisis. The case of Xarxa Oberta

The deployment of fibre based Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs) entails a crisis dilemma. During crisis, public administrations are eager to actively impulse investment in NGANs since the deployment of these networks may increase productivity in the long run and promote economic recovery in the short run. However, the crisis has reduced the access to the credit market and has increased the fiscal deficit. Consequently, the resources of the public sector to invest have been severely limited. Thus, it is crucial to analyse how the public investment plans in NGANs should be designed and implemented during bad times, under scarcity of public resources. The article proposes some guidelines for the design and implementation of effective and affordable public projects for the deployment of NGANs. These guidelines are illustrated by discussing the Xarxa Oberta case, a project for the deployment of a NGAN in Catalonia (Spain).     

Exclusive contents and next generation networks

This paper analyzes the interaction between the market of contents and the development of the next generation network (NGN) industry. We assume structural separation between the network and service operators and the comparative advantage of the service operators depends on the access to premium contents. On one side, we analyze how the structure of the market of contents (the scope of exclusivity contracts) may affect deployment and competition in a NGN setting. On the other side, we endogenize the structure of the market of contents given the presence of NGNs, where a content provider can sell contents directly to consumers, by-passing telecom operators (disintermediation, over-the-top content). In this context, we show that exclusivity only occurs when the content is not highly valued by consumers. Finally, the implication of our analysis for the evolution of the telecommunications industry is discussed.     

Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism

This paper analyzes the interplay between firms' self-regulation (often denoted as corporate social responsibility) as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently high externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods .