Problems and challenges facing the islamic banking system in the west: The case of the UK

This study investigates the main problems, challenges, and opportunities facing Islamic banking in the United Kingdom. The study reports the results of interviews that were undertaken with senior officials of several key financial institutions who have had many years of experience in dealing with Islamic banking. Our interviews revealed that, although by strict definition Islamic banks do not currently exist in the UK, London is one of the major centers for Islamic banking and finance. It is apparent that the experience of previously established Islamic institutions, such as Al‐Baraka, has made other institutions realize that it is possible to provide Islamic banking services in the UK under nonbanking regulations. The interviews also revealed that the main problem that Islamic banking faces in the UK is heterogeneous clients and potential clients. Moreover, regulatory hurdles, competition from conventional banks, and lack of adequately qualified and trained personnel exacerbate the situation. The study concludes by identifying opportunities such as e‐banking that may have a significant impact on the future of Islamic banking in the UK. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing

We compare foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology licensing as two modes of entry into a foreign market. While direct entry via FDI dissipates rents in the host country, opportunistic competition from a licensee may erode rents in the entrant's other markets. Since FDI increases competition in the host country while licensing stifles it. welfare is higher under FDI than under licensing.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

Company Financial Performance and ISO 9000 Registration: Evidence from Malaysia

This study investigates factors, including ISO 9000 registration, that impact on corporate performance, in a sample of Malaysian companies. To achieve this objective, the annual reports of 162 companies (81 ISO 9000 accredited companies and 81 non-ISO accredited companies) were collected and a performance evaluation model was estimated. The results of the analysis revealed that factors such as ISO 9000 registration, return on assets (ROA), economic value added (EVA) and industrial category (INDCAT) determine corporate performance.     

MARKET REFORM AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: Evidence from an Error Correction Model

This study models dollar values of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to conditions in seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) during the 1988-1992 period. Although much research on FDI has used time series data to explain inward or outward flows, two things set this study apart. First, this study includes market reforms as independent variables. Second, this study uses newer time series econometric tools (unit root test and cointegration analysis) to correct for a spurious regression. Our model is robust, explaining 79.4 percent of variation. We found three independent variables (size of current account deficit, size of GDP, and value of privatization less FDI in privatized companies) to be significant. Although we found directional support for three other independent variables (degree of capital market liberalization, low inflation rate, and depreciation of the real exchange rate), none of these proved significant.     

Do boards know when they hire a CEO that is a good match? Evidence from initial compensation

Are CEO initial compensation packages based on variations in the expected match quality of the hiring firms? Using CEO tenure as a proxy for expected match quality, and a sample of CEO turnovers between 1992 and 2006, we find that CEOs that experience good matches, defined as tenures exceeding four years, have higher initial compensation packages. We also find evidence from exogenous switching regression models that inside CEOs receive a higher good match premium than outside CEOs. To account for economic and regulatory changes across our sample period, we divide our sample into three subsamples: 1992–1997, 1998–2002, and 2003–2006, and repeat our analyses. Even though the positive relation between expected match quality and initial compensation persists across all periods, we find that the good match premium for inside and outside CEOs does not differ in the post-2002 period. We attribute this result to increased board independence and changes in regulation (Sarbanes–Oxley) in the post-2002 sample period.     

Longevity challenges and leadership interventions: Strategy journeys of two Indian banks

This article studies the strategic journeys of two Indian banks in evolving socio-political and economic environments, spread across eight decades. It provides a holistic view of longevity challenges by exploring interdependencies between a firm’s internal dynamics, external environment, and its leaders. This article covers the growth of Canara Bank and Syndicate Bank in distinct phases of unrestricted, regulated, and centrally planned economic environment, and in changing socio-political scenarios. It uses within-case and across-case analysis, contextualised in these conditions, to provide rich insights about measures adopted by firms for their long-term survival and sustenance.     

Multinational firms, exclusivity, and backward linkages

How does the nature of contractual relationships between a multinational and its local suppliers affect backward linkages and welfare in the local industry? We address this question in a two-tier oligopoly model where a multinational transfers technology to its suppliers if they accept an exclusive contract that precludes them from serving its local rivals. Invited suppliers balance the benefits of gaining access to new technology and the derived demand of the multinational against the opportunity of selling to other local firms. Exclusivity reduces competition among local suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to autarky.