Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Evidence from German Establishment Data*

Despite the generally recognized importance of knowledge spillovers, the empirical literature is essentially silent on the type of innovation stimulated by spillovers. We estimate the determinants of product innovations differing in their degree of newness to the adopting firm. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent of participation in R&D cooperation. Spillovers exert no such independent influence on drastic innovation activities. The results support the hypothesis that establishments face difficulties in using knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Establishments exploit spillovers for incremental innovations rather than for drastic innovations. To some degree R&D cooperation can help to overcome the difficulties in using spillovers for drastic innovations. Furthermore, our estimates provide evidence that the firm's own R&D effort and the use of outside information are substitutes.     

Participation and division of labour: a West German case study

Motivation and productivity were increased when the traditional division of labour and surplus was modified to give workers extended tasks and profit-shares in firm Z. In X, traditional division of labour combined with worker-shareholding and formal, representative participation failed to improve motivation.     

The Incentives for Innovative Activity in the Managerial Firm

This paper discusses the incentives for innovation by a manager‐led firm. In particular, it is investigated how remuneration practices influence the choice of a risky project. In the first place, a dynamic model with uncertainty is used to determine the optimal employment level with exogenous growth and risk. In the second part of the paper, growth and risk are explained by R&D expenditures. Optimal investment expenditures for R&D are derived for (i) the profit‐maximizing firm and (ii) the managerial firm, where the manager receives a fixed salary as well as a variable share of profits. If risk neutrality is assumed, then no difference exists. However, if risk aversion is considered, the managerial firm will invest more into R&D than the owner‐led company. Size‐related salaries are an additional reason for higher expenditures of R&D by managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers

Wage Differentials Between Skilied and Unskilled Workers. — This paper analyzes the change in the ratio of wages paid to skilled and unskilled workers and the effect of these changes on employment by means of a simultaneous-equation pooled time-series cross-section analysis. Hypotheses are derived on the basis of specific theories. The data cover 23 industries over the period 1965–90. The explanatory variables are the cyclical deviations from long-run growth as well as several collective bargaining variables. The wage differential has a strong effect on employment of the two groups under investigation. However, demand has no significant impact on the wage relation.     

Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity

The present paper discusses the effects of dispersed versus concentrated capital ownership on investment into innovative activity. While the market for equity capital might exert insufficient control on top managements’ behavior, this weakness may be mitigated by a suitable degree of debt financing. We report the results of an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications. Using a large sample of German manufacturing firms, we find that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers behave.     

TEAMWORK AND INTRA‐FIRM WAGE DISPERSION AMONG BLUE‐COLLAR WORKERS

Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, we find that the use of self‐managed teams is associated with increased intra‐firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue‐collar workers. We also show that moderating factors play an important role. While teamwork interacts positively with employer‐provided further training and a production technology of the most recent vintage, it interacts negatively with the age of the establishment and the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement.     

Profit Sharing and Training*

We analyze the impact of profit sharing on training intensity. Profit sharing may affect training because it is a credible commitment by firms to reward firm‐specific skills, may reduce turnover and leads to peer group pressure to participate in training courses. To eliminate possible selectivity effects, we combine matching with difference‐in‐differences. We identify the proportion of employees participating in profits and differentiate profit sharing according to the percentage of the workers covered. Using German establishment data we find that profit sharing only has a significant effect on training intensity if the majority of the workforce benefits from it.     

Which Firms Buy Licenses? Market Positions and License Expenditures*

This paper presents the empirical results of a comparison of technology licensing expenditures of German companies in order to test implications of the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) model. Aside from standard control variables, the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account. We differentiate between firms intending to secure their present position in the market (incumbents) and those intending to enter a new market (challengers). In line with the prediction of the Gilbert and Newbery model, we find that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants.     

External Financing Constraints and Firm Innovation

We investigate the effect of individual banks affected by the recent financial crisis of 2008/2009 on the innovation activities of their business customers. Firms associated with a bank that relies strongly on the interbank market are more likely to be exposed to a credit supply shock during the financial crisis and therefore face external financing constraints. Exploiting both the extensive and the intensive margin, our difference‐in‐differences results imply that those firms which have a business relation to a bank with higher interbank market reliance reduce their innovation activities during the financial crisis to a higher degree than other firms. Tests for additional expenditures reveal that marketing expenditures show a lower or even no sensitivity to bank financing during the financial crisis.