The distribution of returns from land efficiency improvement in multistage production systems

This paper assesses the distributional consequences of technical changes that improve the efficiency of land and of other inputs in a multifactor crop‐production system. We introduced an equilibrium displacement model (EDM) by using the specification of a factor‐augmenting approach. Given the uncertainty about the EDM parameters, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to produce a distribution of possible return measures. We found that land suppliers (likely farmers) receive a larger share (73%) of total benefits from the adoption of land‐technical change than they do from the adoption of other input technologies. Each input supplier receives a larger share of total benefits from technical change in her own input. However, this result is sensitive to the value of the parameters, especially the value of the elasticity of substitution. We applied the EDM to the case of no‐tillage (NT) to provide insight into how the aggregate return from the adoption of NT was distributed among different groups on the Canadian Prairies. The results of this study can be used by policymakers and funding agencies in order to influence landowners and farming communities to adopt environmentally sound land technologies to achieve both greater agricultural productivity and sustainability.     

Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act

This paper analyzes the market and welfare effects of the United States Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act enacted in 2001. The act mandates meat packers to report their transactions daily to a government agency and requires the agency to make a summary of those transactions available to the public through the Mandatory Livestock Meat Market News Reports. Considering the case of an imperfect packer cartel that uses trigger price strategies, this paper examines the impact of market information provided by the reports on equilibrium livestock slaughter and the welfare of the groups involved and identifies the determinants of the socially optimal level of information. A key result of the paper is that, even when facilitating collusion among packers, increased market information can be social welfare enhancing.     

Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario

This study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters—likelihood and severity—and the experience of being penalized. In order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities, e.g., measuring entities’ beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties, our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the US Clean Water Act. This choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results. Based on a variety of statistical methods, our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence, whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior.     

An Experimental Analysis of Regulatory Interventions for Complex Pricing

Considerable evidence demonstrates that consumers make poor choices when facing complex multidimensional pricing schemes. The problem is clear but appropriate regulatory interventions less so. We study the efficacy of five different interventions to improve consumer decision making in an experimental context where subjects choose among a set of predefined phone plans involving nonlinear tariffs. We compare two types of intervention: information provision and consumer literacy training. We find that training about plan costs significantly improves decision quality, while providing information about plan value assists inexperienced decision makers, and visual feedback helps experienced decision makers. Implications for policy are discussed, mindful of heterogeneous consumer literacy and the infrequency with which consumers are actually “in the market” for a better phone service plan.     

Implementing the Kyoto Accord in Canada: Abatement Costs and Policy Enforcement Mechanisms

The anticipated abatement costs to be incurred by Canada and six of its provinces from the implementation of the Kyoto agreement (reduction of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions generated by fossil fuel burning by 6% from 1990 levels) are estimated using an emissions benefit function. Marginal abatement cost functions are estimated and used for the analysis of alternative policy enforcement mechanisms. The efficiency of a policy mechanism depends on the rule used to allocate the burden of the agreement among the provinces and on whether the provinces or the federal government implement the agreement at the provincial level. Under the rule of an equal emission reduction of 6% over 1990 levels in all provinces, Quebec bears no abatement costs while British Columbia and Saskatchewan incur the highest costs. An allocation rule based on the equimarginal principle achieves aggregate efficiency; it is, however, the rule that contains the risk of noncompliance by provinces that have already taken action toward emissions reduction. Les auteurs estiment ce qu‘il en coûtera au Canada et à six de ses provinces pour adopter les mesures antipollution qu'exigera la mise en ?uvre du protocole de Kyoto (réduction de 6 % des rejets de CO₂ attribuables aux combustibles fossiles par rapport aux chiffres de 1990) au moyen d'une fonction faisant intervenir avantages et émissions. Ils estiment les fonctions du coût marginal des mesures antipollution et se servent des résultats pour étudier d'autres mécanismes visant à faire respecter les politiques. L'efficacité du mécanisme d'exécution dépendra, d'une part, de la régle qui servira à répartir le fardeau de la mise en ?uvre entre les provinces et, d‘autre part, de l‘application de l'accord par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial, au niveau des provinces. En supposant une réduction uniforme des rejets de 6 % par rapport aux relevés de 1990, dans toutes les provinces, l'exécution des mesures antipollution ne coûtera rien au Québec, tandis que la Colombie‐Britannique et la Saskatchewan accuseront les frais les plus élevés. Une régle de répartition reposant sur le principe de l'équimarginalité s'avérera efficace globalement, mais on courra le risque que les provinces qui ont déjà pris des mesures pour combattre la pollution refusent de s‘y plier.     

Journal Rankings,Collaborative Research and Publication Strategies: Evidence from China

Abstract

The primary focus of our paper is on the potential for in-house journal ranking lists to create friction between international collaborating researchers due to differences in how particular journals are rated on different lists. Using a questionnaire distributed to Chinese accounting researchers, we identify a number of potential friction points between Chinese and UK researchers. We find that almost all of our Chinese respondents use their own school's in-house ranking list as the primary or exclusive reference point for assessing journal quality, and 73% of respondents acknowledge that this has caused problems when working with scholars from other universities because of differences in how their institutions rank journals.     

Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment: An Experimental Investigation

Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected penalty depends on both the probability of punishment and the severity of the punishment if caught. A key question in the economics of crime literature is whether increasing the probability of punishment is a more effective deterrent than increasing the severity of punishment. This article uses laboratory experiments to investigate this issue and finds that increasing the severity of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the probability of punishment. This result contrasts with the findings of the empirical crime literature.     

Medium,message and advertising effectiveness in the Greek processed meats industry

This paper examines the effectiveness of advertising in the fast-growing Greek processed meats sector using an unbalanced panel data set of 34 firms during the period 1983–1997. In analysing the relationship between firms' sales and advertising this study differentiates between the type/content of the advertising message and the medium used to communicate it. Advertising expenditures are disaggregated into company and product campaigns in television, radio, and print media. Empirical results strongly reject the hypothesis of homogeneous consumer response to all kinds of advertising that is implicit in studies that aggregate advertising expenditures. The results also indicate an inefficient allocation of advertising resources by the firms of the sector; advertising in the least utilized print media was determined to be by far the most effective strategy during the study period.     

A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time

We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-)continuous time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The cooperation levels of the continuous time treatments are not significantly different from the discrete time treatments. Providing subjects with the information on the effort choices of all group members increases the average effort level in continuous time only. The minimum effort level in continuous time with full information feedback is also substantially higher than that with limited information feedback, but the difference is statistically insignificant. With limited information feedback, subjects rarely coordinate to increase their efforts simultaneously to change the group minimum within a period. Our findings imply that continuous time games are not behaviorally equivalent to infinitely repeated discrete time games.     

Why Do Differences in Provincial Incomes Persist in Indonesia?

Despite 20 years of sustained economic growth that saw provincial GDPs rise and inequalities in per capita provincial GDPs fall, per capita income disparities among provinces persist. In this paper we present evidence that poor provinces have tended to catch up with middle- and high-income provinces, hut that regions at the top and bottom of the distribution in 1975 finished. In similar positions in 1993 lnvestments in human capital (education and health) seem to be the most effective way of increasing provincial incomes and reducing the disparities in provincial GDP per capita. The poorer provinces and rural areas can grow faster than the richer ones because they can gain the most from better health and education, they have the highest rates of illiteracy, fertility, and infant, child and maternal mortality.