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In this paper, we analyze the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which simultaneously assert jurisdictions. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. Our main finding is that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, economic integration should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is more likely to arise between countries of similar market size and for moderate competition policy rules. 相似文献
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Lars-Hendrik Röller 《Empirica》2011,38(3):287-314
This paper puts forward some challenges facing European Competition Policy. It starts out with the premises that European
Competition Policy has been one of the great achievements of European Integration. However, there are several areas of competition
policy that remain to be challenging, especially in terms of their economic impact on consumers, markets, and firms. Specifically,
the paper addresses four areas: (1) efficiencies in merger control properly, (2) market definition, (3) the role of distortions
of competition in state aid control, and (4) the balance between competition policy and regulation. 相似文献
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This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By new economy we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of substantive issues in merger control – market definition, assessment of competitive effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in new economy-type markets. 相似文献
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This first review of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) gives an overview on DG COMP’s mandate and the main developments of 2005. The discussion includes institutional and policy developments, as well as the main competition policy decisions and Court judgments in the merger, antitrust, and state aid areas. It is argued that the trend towards a more effects-based analysis in EU competition policy had an impact on the assessment of competition cases, as well as on the development of soft law. For example, the effects-based approach was put high on the agenda with the publication of the Article 82 discussion paper. Similarly, the publication of the State Aids Action Plan (SAAP) launched a “more economic approach” in European state aid assessment. In line with its objective to focus resources on key sectors, two major inquiries were launched in the energy and financial sectors.The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not in any way represent an official position of the European Commission. Until 1 September 2006, Lars-Hendrik Roeller was the Chief Economist at DG Competition. He is now the President of the European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) in Berlin and a Professor at Humboldt University. 相似文献
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David H. Good M. Ishaq Nadiri Lars-Hendrik Röller Robin C. Sickles 《Journal of Productivity Analysis》1993,4(1-2):115-125
In this paper we carry out technical efficiency and productivity growth comparisons among the four largest European carriers and eight of their American counterparts. The time period of our comparisons is 1976 through 1986. This is a particularly interesting period since it begins just after the informal steps toward deregulation in the United States and ends just prior to the introduction of the first wave of reforms by the Council of Ministers in Europe. We also identify the potential efficiency gains of the European liberalization by comparing efficiency differences between the two carrier groups. The reductions in inefficiency describe the amount that inputs can be decreased without altering output. 相似文献
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Complementarities in innovation policy 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We apply our test to two types of innovation decisions: to innovate or not, and if so, by how much. We find that the evidence regarding the existence of complementarity in innovation policies depends on the phase of innovation that is targeted (getting firms innovative or increasing their innovation intensity) as well as on the particular pair of policies that is being considered. The two phases of the innovation process, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of innovation, are subject to different constraints. Interestingly, there seems to be a need to adopt a package of policies to make firms innovate, while a more targeted choice among policies is necessary to make them more innovative. 相似文献
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Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:4
Damien J. Neven Lars-Hendrik Rller 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2005,23(9-10):829
This paper considers the political economy environment that an antitrust agency is operating in and asks under what circumstances a consumer surplus standard yields higher welfare than a welfare standard. In particular, we address how institutional settings—such as transparency and accountability—interact with the choice of an appropriate standard. We consider a framework in which the antitrust agency can be influenced by third parties (at a cost in terms of real resources) and in which the agency is imperfectly monitored. A welfare comparison between the two standards reveals that neither standard dominates. The consumer surplus standard is attractive relative to a welfare standard, when lobbying is efficient, when accountability is low, where mergers are large and when a marginal increase in merger size is highly profitable. 相似文献
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