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This paper studies ex post individually rational, efficient partnership dissolution in a setting with interdependent valuations.
We derive a sufficient condition that ensures the existence of an efficient dissolution mechanism that satisfies Bayesian
incentive compatibility, ex post budget balancedness, and ex post individual rationality. For equal-share partnerships, we
show that our sufficient condition is satisfied for any symmetric type distribution whenever the interdependence in valuations
is non-positive. This result improves former existence results, demonstrating that the stronger requirement of ex post individual
rationality does not always rule out efficiency. We also show that if we allow for two-stage revelation mechanisms, in which
agents report their realized payoffs from the allocation, as well as imposing penalties off the equilibrium path, efficient
dissolution is always possible even when the interdependence is positive. We further discuss the possibility of efficient
dissolution with ex post quitting rights. 相似文献
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In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view. 相似文献
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