An Experimental Investigation of Increased Professional Education Requirements*

Abstract. We experimentally investigate the effects of a mandatory increase in education on the market for professional labor services when several service qualities are assumed to exist. We show that when suppliers have insufficient incentives to offer high-quality services in a free market, an increase in mandatory education can improve the coordination of supplier decisions and increase efficiency. If suppliers voluntarily provide a sufficient quantity of high-quality services, an education constraint can have the opposite effect. In both instances, however, an increase in the mandatory level of education can be expected to reduce the price of high-quality services while increasing the price of lower service qualities. Résumé. Les auteurs ont procédé à une analyse expérimentale des conséquences qu'aurait une hausse imposée du niveau d'études sur le marché des services professionnels, si l'on suppose l'existence de plusieurs qualités de services. L'analyse démontre que lorsque les stimulants sont insuffisants pour inciter les fournisseurs à offrir des services professionnels de qualité supérieure dans un marché libre, une hausse imposée du niveau d'études peut améliorer la coordination des décisions des fournisseurs et augmenter l'efficience. Si toutefois les fournisseurs offrent de leur propre chef une quantité suffisante de services de qualité supérieure, le fait d'imposer un niveau d'études supérieur peut avoir l'effet contraire. Dans les deux cas, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'une hausse du niveau d'études obligatoire réduise le prix des services de qualité supérieure tout en augmentant le prix des services de qualité plus faible.     

Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within‐period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell‐side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.     

Towards a More General Approach to Trade Liberalization

Despite the frequency with which they have been promoted as a model of development. East Asian trade policies have had little influence on the normative economics of trade reform. In contrast to directly dismantling protection, developing countries have often provided concessional import rights which override existing protection. These instruments include EPZs and duty remission. This paper accommodates these instruments of 'new trade liberalization' within a more general understanding of trade liberalization illustrating their similarities and their differences. Both old and new trade liberalization can, on their own, bring about complete free trade. Needless to say, so far, neither has!     

The Market for Equity Options in the 1870s

The introduction of exchange-traded options in 1973 led to explosive growth in the stock options market, but put and call options on equity securities have existed for more than a century. Prior to the listing of option contracts, trading was conducted in an order-driven over-the-counter market. From 1873 to 1875, quotes for options contracts were published weekly in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle during a period that saw extensive marketing efforts by a number of brokerage firms. In this article we examine these quotes to determine why this seemingly sophisticated market existed for only a brief period in financial history.