ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME INEQUALITY REVISITED: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL

We investigate the causal relationship between income inequality and economic freedom using data from U.S. states over the period 1981 to 2004 within a panel error correction model framework. The results indicate bidirectional causality between income inequality and economic freedom in both the short and the long run. These results suggest that high income inequality may cause states to implement redistributive policies causing economic freedom to decline. As economic freedom declines, income inequality rises even more. In other words, it is quite possible for a state to get caught in a vicious circle of high income inequality and heavy redistribution. (JEL D63, H11)     

A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*

Absolute polarization indices remain unchanged under equal absolute augmentation in all incomes. This paper identifies the class of absolute polarization indices whose orderings of alternative income distributions agree with the rankings generated by nonintersecting absolute polarization curves. We explore the possibility of using the Kolm (1976) – Blackorby‐Donaldson (1980) ethical absolute inequality index in polarization measurement. We establish that although inequality and polarization are dissimilar concepts, different absolute inequality indices can be employed to design alternative absolute polarization indices. A numerical illustration is provided using Indian data and it is shown that inequality and polarization are different issues in income distribution analysis.     

Government Makes Exchange Rates Volatile

The foreign exchanges operate in markets that are widely distrusted as unpredictable and destabilising for international trade. Roy Batchelor and Geoffrey Wood argue that history and argument show that it is government that makes the exchanges more volatile, because it adds a range of uncertainty which is the most unpredictable.     

Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden

Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( 2004 , 2007 ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential.     

An Analysis of the Acquisition of Some Consumer Competencies Among Adolescents

Recent public policy discussions have focused on the role and influences of television, school, and family in teaching young people various desirable and undesirable consumer-related cognitions and behaviors. This research provides a theoretical and empirical basis useful in resolving such issues. The study examined the influences of television, family, school and peers on the acquisition of specific consumer skills that contribute to the individual's competency and proficiency as a consumer in the marketplace.     

“Lucas” in the Laboratory

We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing.