Inflation Uncertainty and Strike Activity

In this paper, we hypothesize that the general level of uncertainty can influence the level of strike activity. We test this hypothesis by considering the impact of inflation uncertain & on strike activity. Two databases are used: a pooled time-series cross-section sample of individual negotiations over the period 1971–1980, and quarterly data on negotiations from 1954 to 1980. Results from both data sets support the proposition that inflation uncertainty influences strike activity.     

Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?”

Becker's result that fines should be maximized is also applicable to some social environments where law enforcers are corrupt. If the regulated activity is legal, the principal may efficiently deter crime without an anti‐corruption unit. An opportunistic anti‐corruption unit, even when corrupt, becomes useful for the principal when the activity is illegal, since the principal's goal of maximizing fines motivates the unit to collect bribes from the enforcer, which subsequently induces the enforcer to be nearly completely honest, minimizing corruption. Therefore, we show that there is not necessarily an infinite regress originating with the puzzle of who polices the police.     

Race,Compensation and Contract Length in the NBA: 2001–2002*

We study race and pay in the NBA for 2001–2002. For players who were neither free agents nor on rookie scale contracts, there were large, statistically significant ceteris paribus nonwhite shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract duration. But for players under the rookie salary scale (first‐round draft picks) and free agents, race effects were small and insignificant. These results suggest discrimination against marginal nonwhite players.