The effects of mergers on price and output: Two case studies from the airline industry

The literature on industrial organization contains very little direct evidence on the effects of actual mergers. This study estimates the effects of two recent airline mergers approved by the Department of Transportation over the objection of the Department of Justice. The merger of TWA and Ozark appears to have caused a slight increase in fares and a far greater reduction in service on city pairs out of St Louis. The merger of Northwest and Republic appears to have caused a significant increase in fares and a significant reduction in overall service on city pairs out of Minneapolis-St Paul.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.     

An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial Organization

Simulation offers a rigorous methodology for addressing policy or litigation issues that require a comparison of an observed state of the world with an unobserved one. Simulation employs a calibrated, structural oligopoly model to describe the unobserved state of the world. Calibration involves reliance on real-world observations to set the key parameter values in the model. Simulation is an increasingly important tool of the industrial organization economist, particularly in analyzing the competitive effects of mergers. Papers in this symposium illustrate merger simulations in a variety of contexts and one other application of simulation.     

Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches

Despite the well-known Cellophane fallacy, the Merger Guidelines' market-delineation paradigm, which examines the effects of price increases above the prevailing level, has substantial utility in many monopoly cases. For monopoly cases in which the Guidelines' approach is not appropriate due to the Cellophane fallacy, no modification of that approach appears to solve the problem is a useful way. More direct methods for assessing monopoly power are likely to be preferable to structural analysis in many monopoly and merger cases.     

Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.     

The reverse Cellophane fallacy in market delineation

In the landmark Cellophane case, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that du Pont did not have significant market power because the Court evaluated the elasticity of demand for Cellophane at the monopoly equilibrium, at which the elasticity was far higher than at the competitive equilibrium. The Court's error is commonly referred to as the Cellophane fallacy. This paper contends that there also is a reverse Cellophane fallacy. Markets delineated on the basis of prevailing demand elasticities are likely to be too small and the potential for the exercise of market power is likely to be overstated.     

The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization

Qualitative choice models, such as the logit model, can capture important firm and product asymmetries. This paper surveys use of the logit model in industrial organization, with special focus on its application to merger analysis. The basic model and its motivation are reviewed, as is its estimation. Discussed in some detail is the use of the logit model to predict the price and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in differentiated products industries. Simulation using a qualitative choice model is argued to be far superior to traditional structural analysis. Logit merger simulations have the particular virtues of low informational and computational burdens and the use of the logit model can be motivated as reflecting a diffuse prior on the structure of demand.     

Microsoft's Pricing of Windows and the Economics of Derived Demand Monopoly

The economic experts in the Microsoft case debated whether Microsoft's pricing of Windows was consistent with Microsoft having a monopoly over personal computer (PC) operating systems. In this debate, PCs were treated as a single homogeneous commodity. This paper demonstrates that PC heterogeneity is likely to reduce substantially the monopoly price of Windows. The reason is that low-end PCs, which surely have the more elastic demand, are of disproportionate importance in determining the elasticity of derived demand for Windows.     

Managerial incentives in the financial sector

Despite significant academic and policy interest the nature of managerial incentives in the non- industrial sector has escaped close scrutiny. Contrary to some earlier suggestions, this note finds traditional incentives to maximize profits or market value prevalent in the financial sector.