Regional patterns of employment changes of less-educated men in Japan: 1990–2007

We investigate regional patterns in employment of less-educated men in Japan from 1990 to 2007. The employment–population ratio of junior high school graduate men (9 years of compulsory schooling) decreased from 1990 to 2007. Wage growth across regions had a unique pattern during this period: it was high in the low-wage regions in the 1990s but high in the high-wage regions in the 2000s. We use these regional variations in wage growth to identify the labor supply elasticity of less-educated men. The estimated elasticity of the employment-to-population ratio of junior high school graduate men is around 0.15.     

Mediating Internal Competition for Resources*

We consider a model of internal competition, where projects developed by agents with different preferences compete for resources in an organization. Allowing a manager—who has moderate preferences—to control the allocation of resources has benefits when preferences are not too diverse. In particular, the manager acts as a mediator, forcing agents to compromise when competing projects succeed, thus providing better insurance to agents and increasing their effort. Our framework provides a theoretical foundation for two influential views of a manager—as the “visible hand” that allocates resources, and as a “power broker” who resolves conflict in an organization.     

A risk-sensitive stochastic control approach to an optimal investment problem with partial information

We consider an infinite time horizon optimal investment problem where an investor tries to maximize the probability of beating a given index. From a mathematical viewpoint, this is a large deviation probability control problem. As shown by Pham (in Syst. Control Lett. 49: 295–309, 2003; Financ. Stoch. 7: 169–195, 2003), its dual problem can be regarded as an ergodic risk-sensitive stochastic control problem. We discuss the partial information counterpart of Pham (in Syst. Control Lett. 49: 295–309, 2003; Financ. Stoch. 7: 169–195, 2003). The optimal strategy and the value function for the dual problem are constructed by using the solution of an algebraic Riccati equation. This equation is the limit equation of a time inhomogeneous Riccati equation derived from a finite time horizon problem with partial information. As a result, we obtain explicit representations of the value function and the optimal strategy for the problem. Furthermore we compare the optimal strategies and the value functions in both full and partial information cases.

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The productivity of public capital: Evidence from Japan’s 1994 electoral reform

This paper estimates the causal effect of public capital stock on Production, using Japanese prefectural data. We first articulate the difficulty of consistently estimating the regional-level production function with public capital that results from the endogeneity of the public capital stock amount. The public capital amount could be endogenous because of the central government’s political decision-making process of public capital allocation or the local government’s budgetary constraints.Japan’s electoral reform in 1994 offers an exogenous variation in the public capital investment across regions, and we exploit this event to estimate the causal effect of public capital on production. The reform drastically changed the distribution of political representation in the Lower House across regions, and it accordingly changed the allocation of public capital across regions as well. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that public capital is not productive based on the estimates from this natural experimental identification strategy.     

Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.