Productive Efficiency of the Swine Industry in Hawaii: Stochastic Frontier vs. Data Envelopment Analysis

Improving productive efficiency is an increasingly important determinant of the future of the swine industry in Hawaii. This paper examines the productive efficiency of a sample of swine producers in Hawaii by estimating a stochastic frontier production function and the constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) output-oriented DEA models. The technical efficiency estimates obtained from the two frontier techniques are compared. The scale properties are also examined under the two approaches. The industry's potential for increasing production through improved efficiency is also discussed.     

The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Campaign contributions from corporate PACs

Conclusion This paper provides a theoretical model of the optimal level of campaign contributions by business firms. The model shows that market structure variables are key determinants of the level of campaign contributions. Furthermore, the empirical results support the model's assertion that a reduction in government involvement in an industry could substantially decrease the level of campaign contributions from firms in that industry. Also, reductions in industry concentration through antitrust enforcement could, in fact, increase the level of campaign contributions. This research was funded, in part, by a Villanova University Summer Research Grant. All errors and omissions are the authors.     

The Effect of Industry Concentration on Free Riding

The conventional wisdom regarding industry concentration and cooperative behavior has not been fully supported by the empirical literature. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to explain these mixed results. In the context of an industry that lobbies the government for tariff protection, the model shows that the difficulty of enforcing a cooperative agreement is a function of not only the number of firms in the industry but also the rate of return to lobbying. Thus, when the rate of return to lobbying expenditures is high, the expected relationship may break down.     

The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation: An Economic Theory of Clubs Analysis

The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fellowship opportunities and the spreading of fixed costs across a broader base. Costs include the congestion of facilities and a greater tendency to free ride. The model is empirically tested for four denominations. The average Catholic parish is found to be much larger than its optimal size, while the average Episcopalian, Lutheran, and Methodist congregations are all found to be smaller than their optimal size.     

The Response to Market Power: Non-Profit Hospitals versus For-Profit Hospitals

In the debate over whether non-profit and for-profit hospitals behave differently in the presence of market concentration and greater individual market power, most scholars have concentrated on the traditional price analysis approach. But this has produced conflicting results. This study attempts to avoid the limitations of price as an indicator of how these hospitals respond to greater market power by examining changes in admissions given the capacity decision. The results indicate that for-profit and public hospitals respond similarly to increased market power. On the other hand, private non-profit hospitals appear to act differently. This presents important implications for antitrust policies and for the management of non-profit hospitals.

The most frequent contributors to the elite economics journals: Half century of contributions to the “Blue ribbon eight”

There is a natural curiosity within the economic academic community regarding who are the most frequent contributors to the economic literature. This paper presents an analysis of the top publishers in the “Blue Ribbon Eight” economics journals, over the past 50 years (1954–2003), plus two 25-year subperiods of 1954–1978 and 1979–2003. While it is tempting to use these results to rank economics departments, this paper is meant to be an historical appreciation of these authors and journals and not meant to imply any type of current ranking.     

The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation is faced with substantial competition, while Catholics tend to contribute more when they represent a minority church in a heavily concentrated market. This outcome is explained by arguing that churches with more competition react by providing a more satisfactory product and do a better job of filling niches in the religious marketplace.