Crafting Internal Hybrids: Complementarities,Common Change Initiatives,and the Team-Based Organization

Hybrid governance forms that seek to meld the virtues of both market control and traditional hierarchical control are alluring. Comparatively little research, outside of the M-form literature, has examined internal hybrids - hierarchical forms infused with elements of market control. This paper contends that common change initiatives, such as TQM, re-engineering, autonomous work teams, and group-based rewards, are appropriately viewed as attempts to craft internal hybrids by selectively infusing elements of market control within hierarchy. However, these change initiatives are often implemented in isolation and, as a consequence, violate patterns of complementarity that sustain traditional hierarchy or support the stable infusion of market control.The paper argues that these violations of complementarity often spiral hierarchies toward fundamental transformation. The clear trajectory of these transformations is to quite radically disaggregated organizations structured around teams. The paper presents both theory and evidence supporting the existence of complementarities among these common change initiatives.     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ex Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective

Summary  This paper discusses a number of methodological challenges that ex post evaluation of competition policy faces. We argue that imprecise measurement and simplified analysis not only lead to unreliable results, but also trigger behavioural responses by competition authorities. Because evaluation works as an incentive scheme, it has an immediate impact on the way agencies operate. Faced with simplistic assessment, authorities may be tempted to be overly interventionist, to spend too many resources and to ignore relevant information. Therefore, a careful design of methodologies is important to ensure that ex post control does not bring about the very ills it is supposed to cure. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of DG Competition or the European Commission.     

Opportunity Discovery, Problem Solving and a Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

abstract When should an entrepreneur employ a market to help discover and exploit opportunities, and when should the entrepreneur create a firm to do so? If a firm is created, how should it be organized? In this paper we argue that opportunities equate to valuable problem‐solution pairings, and that opportunity discovery relates to deliberate search or recognition over this solution space. As problem complexity increases, experiential (or ‘directional’) search via trial‐and‐error provides fewer benefits, and cognitive (or ‘heuristic’) search via theorizing becomes more useful. Cognitive search, however, requires knowledge sharing, when knowledge is distributed among specialists, that is plagued by a knowledge appropriation hazard and a strategic knowledge accumulation hazard. Markets, authority‐based hierarchy, and consensus‐based hierarchy then have differential effects on the efficiency of opportunity discovery given the complexity of the associated problem. Those entrepreneurs with exceptional capabilities of opportunity recognition can efficiently adopt authority‐based governance over a wider range of complexity. We thus combine the two major modes of opportunity discovery – search and recognition – onto one framework that can explain different entrepreneurial organizational forms, resulting in an entrepreneurial theory of the firm.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?

Review of Industrial Organization - On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of...     

英语词汇的有意和附带习得——外教口语课堂教学观察

英语词汇的有意和附带习得研究愈来愈引起人们的关注,而如何具体地进行教学的研究却相对较少,尤其是在口语教学如何进行词汇教学。通过对外籍教师的口语课堂教学观察和叙述,旨在展示和分析该外籍教师的教学准备和教学过程,为我国英语教师对于词汇教学方式提供可行性建议。     

Examining the Conditional Limits of Relational Governance: Specialized Assets,Performance Ambiguity,and Long‐Standing Ties

abstract Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter‐organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self‐interested opportunities and long‐standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships.     

Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements

While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitatethe self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submitthat they substitute for or "crowd out" social norms supportinginformal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to testthese theories by manipulating the extent to which individualstransact repeatedly and the level of contract costs. We findthat, by enforcing contractible exchange dimensions, contractsfacilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible dimensions.This complementarity effect is particularly important when repetitionis unlikely and thus self-enforcement is difficult. Althoughour data suggest the existence of reciprocity as an alternative,informal enforcement mechanism, we do not find evidence thatcontracts substitute for this social norm.