Testing Alternative Models Of New Product Diffusion

This paper reports upon the testing of the comparative performance of eight epidemic based diffusion models on data describing the diffusion of camcorders and CD players in the UK and cars in West Germany. Standard epidemic models of new product diffusion are modified to allow for the influence of economic factors and compared to a recent model proposed by Karshenas and Stoneman. The performance of the Karshenas and Stoneman model is good, but so is that of an alternative model in the Marketing literature proposed by Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller.     

What makes growth sustained?

We identify structural breaks in economic growth in 140 countries and use these to define “growth spells:” periods of high growth preceded by an upbreak and ending either with a downbreak or with the end of the sample. Growth spells tend to be shorter in African and Latin American countries than elsewhere. We find evidence that growth duration is positively related to: the degree of equality of the income distribution; democratic institutions; export orientation (with higher propensities to export manufactures, greater openness to FDI, and avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation favorable for duration); and macroeconomic stability.     

Brand Equity, Consumer Learning and Choice

The aim of this paper is to explore the links between brand equity, consumer learning and consumer choice processes in general and considering two recent trends in the market place: store brands and the Internet. We first review the advances that have occurred in brand equity research in marketing in the past decade, with particular emphasis on integrating the separate streams of research emanating from cognitive psychology and information economics. Brand equity has generally been defined as the incremental utility with which a brand endows a product, compared to its non-branded counterpart. We amplify this definition: we propose that brand equity be the incremental effect of the brand on all aspects of the consumer's evaluation and choice process. We propose an agenda of research based on this amplified definition.     

Consumer Information and Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?

Using a large dataset of automobile transaction prices, we find that offline African-American and Hispanic consumers pay approximately 2% more than do other offline consumers; however, we can explain 65% of this price premium with differences in observable traits such as income, education, and search costs. Our estimates of unexplained race premia are smaller than previous estimates in the literature. Online, we find that minority buyers pay nearly the same prices as do whites controlling for consumers' income, education, and neighborhood characteristics. These results are consistent with the Internet facilitating information search and removing cues to a consumer's willingness to pay. Our results imply that the Internet is particularly beneficial to those whose characteristics disadvantage them in negotiating.     

The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer–Manufacturer Negotiations

Store brands are the only brands for which the retailer is responsible not onlyfor promotion, shelf placement, and pricing, but also for positioning the brandin product space. We argue that retailers strongly value control over store brandpositioning because they will be unable to source a national brand with theirdesired product positioning. This is because retailers have an incentive to positionstore brands as close substitutes to leading national brands – a location in productspace which other national brand manufacturers would not find profitable. We presentempirical evidence that is consistent with the results of our model.     

What matters in a price negotiation: Evidence from the U.S. auto retailing industry

While there is a great deal of theoretical and experimental literature on what factors affect bargaining outcomes, there is little empirical work based on data from real markets. In this paper we analyze negotiations for new cars, a $340 billion industry in the United States in 2010. Our results suggest that search costs, incomplete information, and bargaining disutility have an economically significant effect in real-world negotiations: we estimate that relative to an uninformed consumer, a consumer with basic information about the seller’s reservation price and his own outside options captures 15% of the average dealer margin from selling an automobile. We also find that a buyer’s search cost and bargaining disutility have significant effects on bargaining outcomes. Finally, our results show that while search is common, there remains a substantial group of consumers who do not engage in any of the search behaviors we measure. We hypothesize that these buyers are not aware of how easy and effective certain activities in improving negotiation outcomes can be.     

International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality

The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis.     

Internet Car Retailing

We investigate the effect of Internet car referral services on dealer pricing of automobiles in California. Customers of an online service pay on average 2% less for their car ($450 for the average car). 25% of the savings come from purchasing at low-price dealerships affiliated with the online service. The remaining 75% stem from information provision by the online service, bargaining by the service on behalf of consumers, and cost efficiencies. A consumer receiving the mean online price does better than 65% of offline consumers, conditional on the car being purchased.