On efficiency of the ratio estimator

Summary The exact mean square error for the ratio estimator of a finite population total based on simple random sampling without replacement is shown to have an expected value less than that of the variance of the ratio estimator based on Midzuno’s scheme, under a usual super-population model.     

Economic liberalization and welfare in a model with an informal sector

The paper reexamines the conventional results relating to inflow of foreign capital, removal of protectionism and structural reform programmes, in a small open economy in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market distortion and a protectionist policy, inflow of foreign capital may be desirable irrespective of the pattern of trade of the economy due to its favourable impact on welfare. But the welfare implications of tariff reductions and/or structural adjustment programmes, such as deregulating the formal sector labour market, depend crucially on the economy's trade pattern. The paper provides an answer to the question as to whether in a developing economy labour market reform and tariff reform should go hand-in-hand or whether one should precede the other for welfare improvement.
JEL classification: F10, F13, F21, O17.     

中国和印度不平衡发展的比较研究

本文考察了中国和印度近年来经济增长不平衡的情况,并分析了不平衡增长对不均等和贫困的影响。通过对家庭调查数据和官方加总数据的分析,本文发现增长存在不平衡——区域间、产业间和家庭层面上,这表明减贫工作进展不平衡,若增长更平衡,减贫效果可能更好;另外,收入不均等程度也在提高。本文探讨了增长不平衡及其应引起重视的原因。具体讨论围绕"有利的"和"不利的"不均等两个概念展开——不均等与不平衡增长对公平性以及长期增长与发展的有利或不利影响。我们认为,需要制定相关政策,保持有利的不均等——继续鼓励创新和投资,同时降低不利的不均等的程度,尤其是通过人力资本和农村基础设施投资,帮助贫困人口参与市场。     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.     

Competition,External Economies of Scale,and Unionized Wage

We provide a rationale for the mixed relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, and more importantly, for a generally unexplained empirical evidence of a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage. We show that a higher product market competition decreases (increases) unionized wage if the external scale economies are weak (strong). However, a higher product market competition may decrease or increase the unionized wage if the external scale economies are moderate.

     

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.