Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France

We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average.     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

Cross-sectional earnings risk and occupational sorting: The role of risk attitudes

This paper investigates to what extent individuals' risk preferences are correlated with the cross-sectional earnings risk of their occupation. We exploit data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which contains a direct survey question about willingness to take risks that has been shown to be a behaviorally valid measure of risk aversion. As a measure of earnings risk, we use the cross-sectional variation in earnings that is left unexplained by human capital variables in Mincerian wage regressions. Our evidence shows that individuals with low willingness to take risks are more likely to work in occupations with low earnings risk. This pattern is found regardless of the level of occupation categories, region, gender and labor market experience.     

Business managers and moral sanctuaries

Moral Sanctuary is used in this paper as a metaphor for any theory which makes actions immune from moral criticism. Three arguments favoring moral sanctuaries for business activities are countered. Two of the arguments rest on faulty analogies. One compares business activities to games, another to the behavior of machines. The third rests on the claim that business is a unique activity. This position is rejected by a reductio ad absurdum argument; it entails the immunity of all professional activities from moral judgment. I argue that business managers are accountable to the combined requirements of professionalism and democratic citizenship, notions which are briefly described at the conclusion of the paper.     

Do dynamics and heterogeneity in panel data models matter?

This article investigates empirically the determinants of central banks’ reserve holdings for a large panel data set of developing and transition countries covering the period from 1975 to 2003. It estimates both a static and a dynamic relationship and applies estimators for homogeneous and heterogeneous panel data. Thereby, it examines the extent to which conclusions of panel data studies on the determinants of international reserve holdings are robust to the inclusion of dynamics as well as to the consideration of heterogeneity across countries. The results show that the neglect of dynamics and heterogeneity in country behaviour may lead to misleading inferences. Independently of the chosen estimation method, the findings suggest that trade openness and external debt are robust determinants of the level of reserves. Central banks take precautionary measures against the downside of the increasing international economic integration.     

Pflegeberatung ist Vertrauenssache

M?ngeln in der h?uslichen Pflege pr?ventiv begegnen – Vertrauen ohne Kontrolle, Routine, überforderung oder das Nichtbeachten des Beziehungsgeflechtes zwischen Pflegenden und Gepflegten führt oft zu Problemen. Der Gesetzgeber verpflichtete deshalb die Pflegekassen und Tr?gerverb?nde von ambulanten Pflegeeinrichtungen zur Erarbeitung von Richtlinien und standardisierten Verfahren für die Pflegefachberatung. Leider gibt es bislang keine verbindliche Umsetzung.     

The inverse association between the margins of manufacturers and retailers

The margins of manufacturers and retailers are largely determined by the absolute and relative magnitudes of two cross-elasticities that define the willingness of consumers to switch brands within store and to switch stores within brand. When one of these cross-elasticities is high and the other low, margins of firms at the two stages are inversely associated. This phenomenon is widespread but not universal in industries whose retailing segments are imperfectly competitive, as is typically true. The inverse association is inconsistent with “single stage” models which assume that retailing is perfectly competitive and that the derived demand theorem holds. This article explores the dynamics that produce the negative correlation between margins at the two stages, summarizes the empirical evidence and identifies some important areas in which accepted conclusions should be re-examined in light of this relationship.     

Bank reputation in the private debt market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender–borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.