Complexity, Governance and Constitutional Craftsmanship

Economic policy is commonly treated as a vehicle for selecting among possible allocative outcomes within an economy. An economy, however, is a complex network of relationships whose patterns can be understood but whose details can be neither predicted nor controlled. Because of this complexity, allocative outcomes are not direct objects of choice. They are simply emergent consequences of human interaction that takes place within some framework of governing rules and conventions. All economic policy can do is modify some of the rules that govern this interaction. Economic policy is thus constitutive and not allocative in character, being centrally involved in shaping the character of the regime that governs our relationships with each other.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Austrian Economics and Public Choice

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

The Political,Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina

In this paper, we examine the resiliency of community recovery after a natural disaster. We argue that a resilient recovery requires robust economic/financial institutions, political/legal institutions, and social/cultural institutions. We explore how politically and privately created disaster preconditions and responses have contributed to or undermined institutional robustness in the context of the Gulf Coast's recovery after Hurricane Katrina. We find that where postdisaster resiliency has been observed, private-sector responses contributing to the health of these institutional arenas are largely responsible. Where postdisaster fragility and slowness has been observed, public-sector responses contributing to the frailty of these institutional arenas are largely the cause. In other words, we engage in a comparative institutional analysis of civil society, entrepreneurial commercial society, and government agencies and political actors in the wake of a natural disaster.     

Are regulations the answer for emerging stock markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland

Does the emergence of a stock market require a well-developed legal and/or regulatory system? Although historical work by Neal and Davis [Neal, L., & Davis, L. (2005). The evolution of the rules and regulations of the first emerging markets: The London, New York, and Paris stock exchanges, 1792–1914. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 45, 296–311] and Stringham [Stringham, E. (2003). The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth century Amsterdam. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43, 321–344] suggests that securities markets have successfully developed with little government oversight, numerous authors [including Black, B. (2001). The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. University of California Law Angeles Law Review, 48, 781–855; Coffee, J. (1999). Privatization and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure. Journal of Corporation Law, 25, 1–39; Frye, T. (2000). Brokers and bureaucrats: Building market institutions in Russia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 853–899; Mlčoch, L. (2000). Restructuring of property rights: An institutional view. In L. Mlčoch et al. (Eds.), Economic and Social Changes in Czech Society After 1989. Prague: The Karolinum Press; Pistor, K. (2001). Law as a determinant for equity market development – the experience of transition economies. In Peter Murrell (Ed.), The Value of Law in Transition Economies (pp. 249–287). Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press; Stiglitz, J. (1999). Whither reform. Ten years of the transition. Keynote Address, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28–30, 1999; Zhang, X. (2006). Financial market governance in developing countries: Getting the political underpinnings right. Journal of Developing Societies, 2, 169–196] argue that the Czech Republic and other Eastern European governments need more regulation for their newly created stock markets. They maintain that the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which is seen as more regulated, has outperformed the Prague Stock Exchange which is seen as largely unregulated. Thus increased regulations are a key to increased performance. This article, however, maintains that the evidence from the Czech experience has been misinterpreted. This article provides an in depth case study of the Czech stock market and finds that (a) Czech capital markets have been hindered by government intervention from their beginning, (b) that the evidence on Poland's superior performance is not as strong as suggested, and (c) that Czech regulators seem to be unqualified, lack the proper incentives, and are unlikely to benefit the market. Under these circumstances it appears that Neal and Davis (2005:311) are correct that increased government involvement is unlikely to improve the situation.     

An anarchist’s reflection on the political economy of everyday life

James Scott has written a detailed ethnography on the lives of the peoples of upland Southeast Asia who choose to escape oppressive government by living at the edge of their civilization. To the political economist the fascinating story told by Scott provides useful narratives in need of analytical exposition. There remains in this work a “plea for mechanism”; the mechanisms that enable social cooperation to emerge among individuals living outside the realm of state control. Social cooperation outside the formal rules of governance nevertheless require “rules” of social intercourse and techniques of “enforcement” to ensure the disciplining of opportunistic behavior.     

The Austrian School of Economics: A view from London

The Review of Austrian Economics - This paper explores the intellectual context of the Department of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) during the 1930s. We...     

Symposium on Ludwig Von Mises: Nation State and Economy

The Review of Austrian Economics -