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Recent developments in behavioral public economics have shown that heterogeneous biases prevent point identification of deadweight loss. We replicate this result for an arbitrary (closed) consumption set, whereas previous results on heterogeneous attention focused on binary choice. We find that one can bound the efficiency costs of taxation based on aggregate features of demand. When individuals have linear demand functions, the bounds for deadweight loss are easy to calculate from linear regressions. 相似文献
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Sandro Brusco 《Economic Theory》1995,5(3):419-444
Summary We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition which we callcondition . The condition is analogous tocondition C that Moore and Repullo [1988] show to be necessary for subgame perfect implementation in games of complete information, and it is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991]. Our first theorem establishes that Incentive Compatibility, Closure and Condition are necessary for implementation.Our second theorem establishes sufficient conditions. We show that any SCS which satisfies Incentive Compatibility, Closure and a condition called Sequential Monotonicity No Veto (SMNV) is implementable. SMNV is similar in spirit but weaker than the Monotonicity No Veto condition stated in Jackson [1991]. It is also similar to a combination of condition and No Veto Power, which Abreau and Sen show to be sufficient for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium.This paper is a revised version of a chapter of my dissertation at Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. I would like to thank, without implicating, Faruk Gul, Bob Wilson and especially John Roberts for their constant advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank participants at the 1993 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society and a referee for comments leading to substantial improvement in the paper. Financial support from Bocconi University is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
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Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Sandro Brusco 《European Economic Review》2005,49(3):659-681
Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount. 相似文献
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Sandro Brusco 《Review of Economic Design》1998,3(3):271-300
In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents
observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions
for implementation under various informational structures are provided.
Received: 6 April 1996 / Accepted: 19 April 1998 相似文献
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Michael J. Brusco Douglas Steinley J. Dennis Cradit Renu Singh 《Journal of Operations Management》2012
To date, the vast majority of cluster analysis applications in OM research have relied on traditional hierarchical (e.g., Ward's algorithm) and nonhierarchical (e.g., K-means algorithms) methods. Although these venerable methods should continue to be employed effectively in the OM literature, we also believe there is a significant opportunity to expand the scope of clustering methods to emergent techniques. We provide an overview of some alternative clustering procedures (including advantages and disadvantages), identify software programs for implementing them, and discuss the circumstances where they might be employed gainfully in OM research. The implementation of emergent clustering methods in the OM literature should enable researchers to offer implications for practice that might not have been uncovered with traditional methods. 相似文献
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We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is
incomplete information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost,
and efficiency requires some of them to shut down when the inefficient regulation is eliminated. The government can set up
a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies and requiring firms to exit the market at a given time depending on the information
collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy prescribes that some inefficient firms remain active and are subsidized.
The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at which the firms are allowed to exit.
We are very grateful to Matt Mitchell whose comments substantially improved the paper. 相似文献
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Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases. 相似文献
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Sandro Brusco 《Journal of Economic Theory》1998,80(2):185-200
In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using sequential mechanisms, i.e., we show that it is possible to obtain the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44; D70. 相似文献