Effects of differential information on the after-market valuation of initial public offerings

This paper examines the after-market for initial public offerings (IPOs), particularly the security valuation effects of structural differences in available information. There is a diversity of information among issuing firms at the time of their offering and particularly under certain market conditions. Because this diversity decreases with time and after-market trading, the IPO market provides an ideal setting for testing errors due to differential information levels in early after-market valuation of IPO firms. We find evidence that during “hot” market conditions and for firms characterized by low levels of available information, the market values of issuing firms are more likely to be overestimated in the immediate after-market. We also find positive overestimation of market values to be more likely for larger IPOs and for those marketed by the less prestigious underwriters.     

分析“分析美学史”的价值——序刘悦笛的《分析美学史》

作为对分析哲学的令人欣喜的贡献,刘悦笛的《分析美学史》,有助于形成对20世纪西方社会中的哲学美学的整体进程的基本理解。刘悦笛的文本正确估价了分析哲学对于美学研究的贡献,其所追踪的历史进程横亘了整个20世纪。这项任务主要是通过从美学家的贡献到美学主题的贡献的诸章节来共同实现的,每章在介绍与总结的部分都提出了作者自己对于分析美学重要性的解释和评价。刘悦笛所选择的美学家们对于这部分析美学简史而言是毫无疑义的,因为他们形成了在这场运动当中的最重要的形象。这种选择代表了一种系统的结构,这对于非西方读者们更深入地理解分析美学具有特别的重要价值。在对历史的精细的组织与敏锐的洞见当中,刘悦笛所提供的坚实的基础,对于学者和学生们而言就像一个坚实的平台,可以由此去探索那些在分析美学史上提出令人瞩目的理念的人们的作品。     

Interconnection in Network Industries

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple bill and keep rule.     

Asymmetric Network Interconnection

We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks,that allows for carriers to differ in size. Under two-partpricing, we show that because of asymmetry the larger network willalways prefer a reciprocal interconnection charge be set at cost.For sufficiently large asymmetry the smaller network will have thesame preference. Under the assumptions of our model a particularly simple regulation is optimal – if carriers cannot agree on the terms of interconnection, the larger carrier is entitled to select the access price which is then applied reciprocally.