An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders

We consider the competition among quantity setting players in a linear evolutionary environment. To set their outputs, players adopt, alternatively, the best response rule having perfect foresight or an imitative rule. Players are allowed to change their behavior through an evolutionary mechanism according to which the rule with better performance will attract more followers. The relevant stationary state of the model describes a scenario where players produce at the Cournot‐Nash level. Due to the presence of imitative behavior, we find that the number of players and implementation costs, needed to the best response exploitation, have an ambiguous role in determining the stability properties of the equilibrium and double stability thresholds can be observed. Differently, the role of the intensity of choice, representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, has a destabilizing role, in line with the common occurrence in evolutionary models. The global analysis of the model reveals that increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter determine increasing dynamic complexities for the internal attractor representing a population where both decision mechanisms coexist.     

Food Competition in World Markets: Some Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis of Top Exporting Countries

This paper investigates the relevance of relative prices and world income as determinants of food exports for the top trading countries in the period 1992–2012 using a panel data framework. We find that price elasticities generally take lower values for processed goods, and the opposite holds for income elasticities. Processed goods are also characterised by an inverse relationship between price elasticities and average unit values. The analysis suggests that both emerging and advanced countries can be expected to increase their export specialisation in processed goods. Furthermore, developed economies can face fierce competition from emerging countries by enhancing the quality content of their processed good exports.     

A note on symmetry breaking in a non linear marketing model

Decisions in Economics and Finance - In this paper, we consider the nonlinear discrete-time dynamic model proposed by Bischi and Baiardi (Chaos Solitons Fractals 79:145-156, 2015a). The model...     

An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules

We formulate an evolutionary oligopoly model where quantity setting players produce following either the static expectation best response or a performance-proportional imitation rule. The choice on how to behave is driven by an evolutionary selection mechanism according to which the rule that brought the highest performance attracts more followers. The model has a stationary state that represents a heterogeneous population where rational and imitative rules coexist and where players produce at the Cournot–Nash level. We find that the intensity of choice, a parameter representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, the cost of the best response implementation as well as the number of players have ambiguous roles in determining the stability property of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. This marks important differences with most of the results from evolutionary models and oligopoly competitions. Such differences should be referred to the particular imitative behavior we consider in the present modeling setup. Moreover, the global analysis of the model reveals that the above-mentioned parameters introduce further elements of complexity, conditioning the convergence toward an inner attractor. In particular, even when the Cournot–Nash equilibrium loses its stability, outputs of players little differ from the Cournot–Nash level and most of the dynamics is due to wide variations of imitators’ relative fraction. This describes dynamic scenarios where shares of players produce more or less at the same level alternating their decision mechanisms.     

Pigouvian tax,abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N-th order risk changes.     

Precautionary saving under many risks

This paper studies precautionary saving when many small risks are considered. We first introduce two simultaneous risks: labor income and interest rate risks. We show that, in this context, sufficient conditions for precautionary saving are weaker than in similar models. Moreover, we find that, unlike previous literature, precautionary saving can occur in the case of negative covariance between the two risks and in the case of imprudence. We then extend our analysis to a three-risk framework, where a background risk is included. We derive sufficient conditions for precautionary saving which are interpreted in the light of the previous literature.