Education and Intergenerational Mobility in Occupations

A bstract The problem of measuring the intergenerational transmission of inequality and its implications for social welfare is studied. A possible decomposition of relevant factors–namely, educational attainments and other factors–is proposed and applied to three individual data sets regarding Germany, Italy, and the United States. The main result is that educational attainment is responsible for almost half of observed immobility The possibility that increasing equality of opportunity in entering the educational system may result in less inequality in income distribution is considered.     

Capital controls and distribution of income: Empirical evidence for Great Britain Japan and Australia

Zusammenfassung Kapitalverkehrskontrollen und Einkommensverteilung. Empirische Befunde für Gro?britannien, Japan und Australien. - Der Verfasser geht davon aus, da? die Einführung von Kapitalverkehrskontrollen die nationale Einkommensverteilung beeinflu?t; insbesondere zeigt er, da? Ma?nahmen zur Verhinderung von Kapitalabflüssen die Einkommensverteilung zugunsten der Lohnempf?nger verschiebt. Nachdem er die Wirksamkeit von Kontrollen mit Hilfe der Unterschiede zwischen in- und ausl?ndischen Zinss?tzen gemessen und die Erfahrungen dreier L?nder (Gro?britannien, Japan und Australien) berücksichtigt hat, pr?sentiert er einige Korrelationsindizes und Kausalit?tstests, um zu untersuchen, ob m?glicherweise Beziehungen zur Verteilung des Volkseinkommens bestehen. Danach entwickelt und sch?tzt er ein Strukturmodell. Der Autor zeigt, da? das Ausma? der finanziellen Protektion die (optimale) Wahl von Besch?ftigung und Lohn durch heimische Firmen und Gewerkschaften tendenziell beeinflu?t hat.

---

Résumé Les contr?les de capitaux et la distribution du revenu: La preuve empirique pour La Grande Bretagne, le Japon et l’Australie. - Dans cette étude l’auteur soutient l’opinion que l’adoption des contr?les de capitaux se répercutent sur la distribution du revenue national; et plus spécifiquement elle montre qu’en empêchant l’exportation des capitaux, la distribution du revenu change en faveur des salariés. Après avoir mesuré l’efficacité des contr?les à l’aide de l’écart entre les taux d'intérêt nationaux et les taux off-shore et après avoir reconsidéré les expériences de trois pays (Grande Bretagne, Japon, Australie) on présente quelques indices de corrélation et des tests de causalité pour étudier s’il y a des rapports avec la distribution du revenu national. Puis on propose un modèle structurel. Les estimations montrent que le degré de protection financière pourrait avoir influencé la sélection optimale de l’emploi et du salaire par les entreprises nationales et les syndicats.

---

Resumen Controles de capital y distributión del ingreso: evidencia empírica para el Reino Unido, el Japón y Australia. - En este trabajo se argumenta que la adoptión des controles de capital afecta a la distributión del ingreso national. Más específicamente, se demuestra que al impedirse las exportaciones de capital se modifica la distributión del ingreso en favor de los asalariados. Después de medir la efectividad de los controles con el diferencial entre las tasas nacionales y las tasas offshore, y de pasar revista a la experiencia de tres países (el Reino Unido, el Japón y Australia), se presentan algunos índices de correlatión y tests de causalidad, con el fin de investigar la existencia de una relatión potential con la distributión del ingreso national. Finalmente, se propone y estima un modelo estructural que muestra que el grado de proteción financiera podría haber afectado la decisión sobre el empleo y el salario (óptimos) por parte de empresas y sindicatos nationales.

     

Inequality and Union Membership: The Influence of Relative Earnings and Inequality Attitudes

Using surveys from the International Social Survey Programme covering the period 1985–2002 for seven European countries (West and East Germany, Sweden, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain), we examine the effect of relative earnings on union membership and show that union density is higher among workers in the intermediate earnings group than among low or high earners. Next, we examine the association of inequality attitudes with union membership and demonstrate that union membership is not only motivated by instrumental considerations related to relative earnings, but also by normative concerns about inequality. We interpret our findings suggesting that rising earnings inequality is in itself a source of union decline.     

Economic interdependence and structural change: an investigation on business cycle transmission

Insomma, non si può osservare una onda senza tenere conto degli aspetti complessi che concorrono a formarla e di quelli altrettanto complessi cui essa dà luogo (I. Calvino, Palomar).     

What are the Real Effects of Liberalizing International Capital Movements?

Progress in financial integration calls for the abolition of capital controls, especially within the European community. Traditional analysis would then predict a better reallocation of productive capacity at the international level. A formal model is developed in order to show that it is impossible to draw unequivocal conclusions; moreover, when financial investors are allowed to allocate their wealth in public bonds, and governments pursue full employment targets, cases exist where the financial liberalization produces a reduction in capital accumulation in both the participating countries.It is my view ... that the new orientation of economic theory towards greater realism in regard to existing economic inequalities will imply the final liquidation of the old laissez-faire prediction and, more specifically, the free trade doctrine and the stable equilibrium approach.     

CAPITAL CONTROLS AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

This paper is a normative analysis of the legal restrictions on international financial movements based on a formal model which analyzes the empirical observation that the degree of financial protectionism is associated with changes in the distribution of welfare among agents. The strategic interactions among four types of agents (a trade union, a firm manager, a financial investor and a government) are analyzed, and the optimal amount of capital control is derived as a Nash perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative game with imperfect information. I conclude that a financial liberalization proposal can be supported by different coalitions of agents, according to the covariance of domestic and foreign returns and the degree of profitability of domestic industrial projects.