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Competition and cooperation are not always at odds and contributions to public goods are almost never one-off one-shot temporally isolated events. We examine voluntary contribution in a new public good experiment where “self-love” competitive motivations and time dynamic interdependencies are simultaneously considered. The competitive motivations are manipulated via subjects competing in each group (intragroup competition) for higher return factors on their public expenditure, whereas time dynamic interdependencies are modeled by letting returns from previous periods available for future contributions to public goods (CG). We ran two control conditions where intragroup competition (C) and time dynamic interdependencies (G) are separately implemented. Our findings showed that shares of endowment contributed were significantly greater and increasing over time when endowments growth and heterogeneous returns factors were simultaneously introduced. This effect can be attributed to return factors obtained in previous periods. Accordingly, wealth exponential growth has been greatly accelerated relative to our control condition. Distributive equity concerns have been also documented. Although Gini coefficients were significantly lower in the presence of heterogeneous return factors and endowments growth, inequality trends seemed to converge at control condition values in the long term.  相似文献   
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In this paper, we present the results of a Learning-to-Forecast Experiment (LtFE) where we eliciting short- as well as long-run expectations regarding the future price dynamics in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback. Comparing our results on short-run expectations with the LtFE literature, we prove that eliciting long-run expectations has no impact on the price dynamics nor on short-run expectations formation. In particular, we confirm that the Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is a good benchmark only for the markets with negative feedback. Interestingly, our data show that while the term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations is convex in positive feedback markets, it is concave in negative feedback markets. Differences in the slope of the term structure stem from diverse degrees of uncertainty regarding the evolution of prices in the two feedback systems: (1) in the negative feedback system, the convergence of the price to the REE reflects a tendency for coordination of long-run expectations around the fundamental value; (2) conversely, oscillatory price dynamics observed in the positive feedback system is responsible for the diverging pattern of long-run expectations. Finally, we propose a new measure of heterogeneity of expectations based on the scaling of the dispersion of expectations over the forecasting horizon.

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Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - This paper investigates systemic risk that emerges from the interplay between uncertain returns to individual actions, uncertainty on...  相似文献   
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We analyze a public good game (PGG) with intragroup competition in which, generally but not always, the dominant strategy is to not contribute; therefore, free riding is the unique Nash equilibrium, not achieving Pareto efficiency. We propose a PGG setup where subjects' contributions are rewarded with different individual returns following a rank‐order voluntary contribution mechanism. It is found that the resulting competition for a better return significantly increases contributions. This effect is sensitive to the salience of return differences rewarding higher contributions. Furthermore, the positive effect of return differences on contribution levels depends on an individual's return‐to‐risk sensitivity as elicited through an independent risk elicitation task.  相似文献   
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