When do Non‐Family CEOs Outperform in Family Firms? Agency and Behavioural Agency Perspectives

Family firms represent a globally dominant form of organization, yet they confront a steep challenge of finding and managing competent leaders. Sometimes, these leaders cannot be found within the owning family. To date we know little about the governance contexts under which non‐family leaders thrive or founder. Guided by concepts from agency theory and behavioural agency theory, we examine the conditions of ownership and leadership that promote superior performance among non‐family CEOs of family firms. Our analysis of 893 Italian family firms demonstrates that these leaders outperform when they are monitored by multiple major family owners as opposed to a single owner; they also outperform when they are not required to share power with co‐CEOs who are family members, and who may be motivated by parochial family socioemotional priorities.     

Robust calibration and arbitrage-free interpolation of SSVI slices

Decisions in Economics and Finance - We describe a robust calibration algorithm of a set of SSVI maturity slices (i.e., a set of 3 SSVI parameters $$\theta _t, \rho _t, \varphi _t$$...     

CEO Succession Mechanisms,Organizational Context,and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms

This article extends the literature on CEO succession and financial performance by addressing corporate owners' mixed motives and desires to protect their interest in being in business. We draw on a Socio‐Emotional Wealth (SEW) perspective to investigate how the choice of one of three succession mechanisms – relay succession, ‘horse races’ among internal CEO candidates, and hiring from outside – may effectively balance trade‐offs between corporate owners' non‐financial SEW motives and the firm's financial performance. We find that implementing one of these succession mechanisms reduces the negative impact that typically characterizes CEO transitions in family firms. We also show that family presence on the board of directors offsets the benefits of having selected these balancing succession mechanisms, in either placing too much emphasis on SEW, or creating negative dynamics that make the chosen succession mechanisms less effective.     

Public Credit Guarantee Schemes and SMEs’ Profitability: Evidence from Italy

The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the Italian State Credit Guarantee Scheme (Central Guarantee Fund). The paper analyzes the impact of the program on SMEs’ profitability considering the firm size and sector. The analysis is performed using propensity‐score matching estimators and the Difference in Differences regressions on a proprietary sample of about 38,000 SMEs in the period 2007–2009. Overall, the Central Guarantee Fund generated an increase in the profitability of guaranteed firms during the period of economic downturn. However, significant differences emerged across firms by size and sector. The effect is positive and robust only for micro‐ and small‐sized firms, and the most relevant improvement in the profitability is recorded for firms operating in the manufacturing sector. This implies that more customized programs are necessary to reach a higher value for money in entrepreneurial policies.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.