Spatial Cournot Competition among Multi-Plant Firms in a Circular City

We characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi-plant Cournot oligopoly in a circular city. Previous work demonstrates that for a two-plant duopoly, all four plants are equally spaced. We establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants. In most other scenarios, multiple equilibria arise. Next, we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly. It is shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may not be unique, and for identical set-up costs, the firms may choose different numbers of plants.     

Entry, Competitiveness and Exports: Evidence from the Indian Firm Data

This paper attempts to evaluate the effects of industrial de-licensing of 1991 and WTO-induced tariff-reforms of 1995 on domestic competitiveness and export performances of the Indian manufacturing during the post-1991. Unlike existing empirical studies not backed by theoretical underpinnings, the paper has been founded on an open-economy-oligopoly-model framework. The paper develops an econometric method of estimating the output from data on sales of the firms, thereby estimating the firms?? marginal cost, which is conducive for the entire empirical analysis with a unified set of firm data. Using firm level data for 14 sectors for the period 1990?C2008, it is observed that there has been an increase in the number of firms resulting in a fall in the concentration ratio and elasticity of demand at the point of equilibrium is generally less than unity and is declining over-time. The panel regression results of increasing exports by bigger firms also conforms the theoretical predictions.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

On the performance of endogenous access pricing

Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the traditional procedure of setting a fixed access price that reflects the regulator’s estimate of the supplier’s average cost of providing access. Under ENAP, the access price reflects the supplier’s actual average cost of providing access, which varies with realized industry output. We show that in addition to eliminating the need to estimate industry output accurately and avoiding a divergence between upstream revenues and costs, ENAP can enhance the incentive of a vertically integrated producer to minimize its upstream operating cost. However, ENAP can sometimes discourage surplus-enhancing investment.     

Sabotaging cost containment

We show that sabotage may be particularly profitable for a vertically-integrated provider (VIP) when its downstream rival can devote effort to reducing its operating costs. Demand-reducing sabotage limits the return the rival anticipates from its cost management activities, and thereby inhibits those activities. The resulting higher costs for the rival increase the VIP’s profit in settings where sabotage would not be profitable if the rival could not manage its operating costs. To limit sabotage by the VIP, the rival may find it profitable to intentionally diminish its ability to reduce its production costs. The diminished ability can produce Pareto gains.     

Perverse liquidity effect of monetary policy: some evidence for India

The liquidity effect of money supply increases, as policy-oriented measures, would generally lead to a decline in interest rates. This is the direct effect. However, such money supply increases lead to a sum of the direct effect plus the positive indirect price and income effects. In sum, the net effect may be positive leading to a net increase and not a decrease in the interest rate. The regular money demand function is suitably modified to capture the structural changes of the Indian economy to verify the net effect of monetary policy-induced money supply movements. The empirical evidence indicates the presence of a perverse liquidity effect.     

Contestability and two-part pricing

This paper contributes to the debate over the relevance of contestability by demonstrating that the welfare properties claimed by proponents depend on the inability of incumbent firms to divide the market. Given the ability to divide the market using two-part prices, the incumbent can protect profitability. This possibility further illustrates the extremity of the assumptions upon which contestability rests as two-part pricing is commonly observed in some of the very markets that might be suggested to be more nearly contestable.The authors thank Barnali Gupta, William G. Shepherd and two reviewers for suggestions on earlier drafts.