Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance δ. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fail to exist in this model, except under special conditions about δ and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium with no-gaps, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies. We find that both players' equilibrium strategies converge to the expected median voter as A's advantage shrinks to 0. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72.     

IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM

We analyze a two‐candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (e.g., interest‐group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do not observe candidates' exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist/rightist platform (relative positions). In equilibrium, candidates' behavior tends to maximum extremism, but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates. When the tie‐breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair, candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter, but when it strongly favors a certain candidate, each candidate specializes in a different extreme.     

The key party in the Catalan government

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the Catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in Catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party. Thanks are due to Andreu Ferré, Marta Guspí, Larry Kranich, Angel Solano and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2003-01961 and CREA-Barcelona Economics. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. This article reflects only the author’s views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.     

Financialization,Globalization and the Management of Skilled Employees: Towards a Market‐Based HRM Model in Large Corporations in France

The article analyses the transformation of HRM policies for skilled employees in large corporations in France over the last decade in relation to changes occurring in governance patterns and competitive strategies. First, we highlight a shift towards globalization and financialization in the strategic management of large corporations in France, entailed by the diffusion of a shareholder form of capitalism in that country. Second, we characterize the market‐based HRM model applied to skilled employees under these new strategic orientations and the diversity of ways in which these transformations are perceived depending on employees' age and level of responsibility within the firm.     

Forecasting correlated time series with exponential smoothing models

This paper presents the Bayesian analysis of a general multivariate exponential smoothing model that allows us to forecast time series jointly, subject to correlated random disturbances. The general multivariate model, which can be formulated as a seemingly unrelated regression model, includes the previously studied homogeneous multivariate Holt-Winters’ model as a special case when all of the univariate series share a common structure. MCMC simulation techniques are required in order to approach the non-analytically tractable posterior distribution of the model parameters. The predictive distribution is then estimated using Monte Carlo integration. A Bayesian model selection criterion is introduced into the forecasting scheme for selecting the most adequate multivariate model for describing the behaviour of the time series under study. The forecasting performance of this procedure is tested using some real examples.     

A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre

Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates, and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by Osborne et al. [2000. Meetings with costly participation. American Economic Review 90, 927-943].     

Shocks to issue salience and electoral competition

Economics of Governance - We propose a two party electoral competition model to analyze the effects of an exogenous shock over the relative issue salience on the strategic policy choices of the...