Debt enforcement,investment, and risk taking across countries

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder–debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’ investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.     

Financial crises and labor market turbulence

Financial crises in emerging markets trigger a significant reallocation of labor as exchange rate depreciations and interest rate increases cause relative prices to change drastically. Household survey data for Mexico reveal that individuals who switched industry or occupation during the 1994–1995 crisis lost about 10% of their hourly earnings on average compared to similar workers who did not move. This suggests that many workers became less productive in the process of migrating to different economic activities. These productivity losses, in turn, can explain about 40% of the observed fall in TFP in Mexico in 1995.     

Agency Conflicts and Risk Management

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts andrisk management. In contrast to previous contributions, ouranalysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflictsbut also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that thecosts of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essentialin determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firmsthat derive more of their value from assets in place (lowermarket-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment,generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, theymay be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestmentincentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firmswith fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartramet al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictionsrelating the benefits associated with risk management to variousdimensions of the firm's economic environment.     

Do Firms Time Their Pollution Abatement Investments Optimally?

In this paper we develop an equilibrium business-cycle model for an economy with both clean and dirty (polluting) plants. We conclude that the best time to implement cleaner production technologies is during a slowdown of the economy. Due to external effects and market failures the timing of pollution abatement investments is not expected to be optimal in the real world. We test the optimality of the timing of those investments with data for Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA. It appears that for more than 25 per cent of the sectors pollution abatement investments show significant counter-cyclical behaviour, while in 10 per cent of the sectors these investments are pro-cyclical.     

The Postal Sector as a Vector of Financial Inclusion

Access to finance has become a major policy issue under the term Financial Inclusion. In this paper, we focus on the role of postal operators in financial inclusion policies. In developing countries, postal firms typically manage a dense network of counters with a unique coverage of rural areas where the banking sector is totally absent. We use a formal location model for postal counters and bank agencies to show that in rural areas a post‐bank partnership can be a vector of financial inclusion and that this can be done profitably.     

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.     

EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION,TECHNOLOGY CHOICE,AND WORKER ALLOCATION

We show empirically that high‐risk sectors, which contribute strongly to aggregate productivity growth, are relatively small and have relatively low productivity growth in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand these findings, we develop a two‐sector matching model where firms endogenously choose between a safe technology and a risky technology. For firms that have chosen the risky technology, EPL raises the costs of shedding workers in case they receive a low productivity draw. According to our calibrated model, high‐EPL countries benefit less from the arrival of new risky technologies than low‐EPL countries. Parameters estimated through reduced‐form regressions of employment and productivity on exit costs, riskiness, and in particular their interaction are qualitatively similar for actual cross‐country data and simulated model data. Our model is consistent with the slowdown in productivity in the European Union relative to the United States since the mid‐1990s.     

Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation

We analyze the effect of mergers on optimal environmental taxation in a Cournot oligopoly market with product differentiation. Our result indicates that the adjustment in emission tax crucially depends on the post-merger output distortion and pollution intensities. Specifically, we find that the optimal emission tax increases post-merger as long as pollution intensity of firms is higher and output distortion smaller post-merger than pre-merger. Furthermore, our result suggests that there is no need to revise environmental policy in markets where pollution intensity of firms does not change post-merger and (i) products are completely differentiated, or (ii) there are many firms for any degree of product differentiation.     

LIMITED ENFORCEMENT,FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION,AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT*

We present a model of economic development where the importance of financial differences caused by limited enforcement can be measured. Economies where enforcement is poor direct less capital to the production sector and employ less efficient technologies. Calibrated simulations reveal that the resulting effect on output is large. Furthermore, the model correctly predicts that the average scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement. Finally, we find that the importance of limited enforcement rises with the importance of capital in production.