Come Rain or Shine: Evidence on Flood Insurance Purchases in Florida

This article provides a detailed analysis of the operation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in Florida, which accounts for 40 percent of the NFIP portfolio. We study the demand for flood insurance with a data set of more than 7.5 million NFIP policies‐in‐force (the largest ever studied) for the years 2000–2005, as well as all NFIP claims filed in Florida. We answer four questions: What are the characteristics of the buyers of flood insurance? What types of contracts (deductibles and coverage levels) are purchased? What are the determinants of claims payments? How are prices determined and how much does NFIP insurance cost?     

How Does the Corporate World Cope with Mega‐Terrorism? Puzzling Evidence from Terrorism Insurance Markets

Terrorist attacks that have succeeded abroad since 2001, as well as others that were prevented, indicate that the threat of a large‐scale attack is real and will be with us for a long time. Focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, this article analyzes the role that insurance can play in providing commercial enterprises with financial protection against the economic consequences of major terrorist attacks. The article begins by explaining the design and key features of terrorism insurance programs operating today in each of the three countries (TRIA in the U.S., Pool Re in the U.K., and Extremus in Germany). The authors then provide a detailed comparative analysis of the evolution of prices and take‐up rates (based on as yet unpublished data), with particular attention to financial institutions. For those who think the U.S. is the most likely target for mega‐terrorism, the findings are somewhat puzzling. On average, for example, companies in the U.S. do not pay even half as much for comparable coverage under TRIA as companies pay in Germany under Extremus, which raises the questions: Is terrorism coverage under the U.S. insurance program now drastically underpriced? If so, what would be the likely consequences of another large‐scale attack in the U.S.? On the demand side, the authors observe a dramatic increase in take‐up rates in the U.S. since 2003, revealing increased corporate concern. By contrast, the market penetration in Germany remains remarkably low. A better understanding of these programs and of the recent evolution of terrorism insurance markets in the U.S. and Europe should help corporate and government decision makers develop more effective protection against the economic consequences of mega‐terrorism.     

Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric

The structural parameters of a share‐auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter‐factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform‐price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions' participants. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of government intervention on the market for corporate terrorism insurance

Nine OECD countries presently have national terrorism insurance programs based on some type of public–private risk sharing. While such arrangements have helped provide the necessary insurance capacity in the post-September 11, 2001 era, little is known about the effect of such governmental intervention on terrorism insurance markets. This paper focuses on the United States, where the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) provides insurers with no cost federal reinsurance up to an industry-wide loss of $100 billion. We present an empirical analysis to compare how insurers' diversification behavior varies between property coverage (no governmental intervention) and terrorism coverage (with government intervention). We find evidence that insurers in the U.S. are much less diversified for terrorism coverage than they are for property lines of coverage. We interpret these findings as tentative evidence for moral hazard caused by the governmental intervention under TRIA.