Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

This paper investigates firms' incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. Two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable. We find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient. These results have implications for market design when investment is important.     

The Essential Features of Technology and Technology Education: A Conceptual Framework for the Development of OBE (Outcomes Based Education) Related Programmes in Technology Education

It appears that programme development in technology education is emerging from an atheoretical perspective. This could be attributed to the absence/neglect of conceptual frameworks (philosophical underpinning) in the development of programmes in technology education. This article explores the role of the content dimension of the 'essential features' of technology and technology education in OBE (Outcomes Based Education) related programme development. An instructional programme was developed using criteria derived from the essential features of technology and technology education. In order to gauge learners' experience, in relation to these essential features, a qualitative case study involving 20 learners was undertaken at a College of Education. Engagement with theprogramme proved to be an empowering experience for the learners who had hitherto not had the opportunity to experience a formal programme in technology education. Although it could not be proved conclusively that cognitive development had occurred, positive inter-dependence,shared responsibility, social skills and enhanced learning were evident. The study has shown that criteria derived from the 'essential features' of technology and technology education could serve as a reliable yardstick to measure the extent of learning in relation to these essential features     

国有企业、金融市场改革与养老保险制度改革的互动效应--中国如何解决老年保障问题?

中国政府非常清楚社会保障所面临的危机，决定寻求解决办法。拟议中的社会保障改革的核心是积累制和整合条块分割的体系，计划为每个工人建立个人退休账户，对养老基金进行有效投资。然而，这种改革受阻于三个关键因素。(1)在向积累制的转化过程中必须支付特制成本；(2)现有的社会保障体系条块分割、分散化管理3(3)已经积累的基金尚未取得高收益，也未分配到最有效率的用途上。     

“Work is my passion”: The different affective,behavioural, and cognitive consequences of harmonious and obsessive passion toward work

This study applies the dualistic model of passion (Vallerand et al., 2003) to the work setting and examines the relationships between harmonious passion (characterized by a strong but controllable desire to engage in an activity), obsessive passion (characterized by an internal pressure to carry out an activity), and optimal functioning outcomes at work. Harmonious passion associated positively with: mental health; three elements of flow (i.e., concentration, control, and autotelic experience); vitality, and affective commitment. These relationships were partly mediated by satisfaction of the basic psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. In contrast, obsessive passion directly and negatively predicted mental health and weakly but positively predicted autotelic experience. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed. Copyright ©2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Procurement when price and quality matter

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer's optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a significant proportion of the buyer's strategic surplus (the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the efficient auction). Bargaining does less well and often does worse than the efficient auction.