Outcomes of voting and planning: Condorcet,Weber and Rawls locations

The paper is concerned with the comparison of the locations of a facility resulting from voting and planning procedures. It is shown that a voting location exists and coincides with that minimizing the total distance covered by the users to go to the facility when the transportation network contains no cycles. For a general network, least upper bounds on the ratio of the social values of the voting and planning locations are given in the cases where the total or the maximal travelled distance is minimized.     

Do managers know what their customers think and why?

The ability of a firm’s managers to understand how its customers view the firm’s offerings and the drivers of those customer perceptions is fundamental in determining the success of marketing efforts. We investigate the extent to which managers’ perceptions of the levels and drivers of their customers’ satisfaction and loyalty align with that of their actual customers (along with customers’ expectations, quality, value, and complaints). From 70,000 American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) customer surveys and 1068 firm (manager) responses from the ACSI-measured companies, our analyses suggest that managers generally fail to understand their firms’ customers in two important ways. First, managers systematically overestimate the levels of customer satisfaction and attitudinal loyalty, as well as the levels of key antecedent constructs such as expectations and perceived value. Second, managers’ understanding of the drivers of their customers’ satisfaction and loyalty are disconnected from those of their actual customers. Among the most significant “disconnects,” managers underestimate the importance of customer perceptions of quality in driving their satisfaction and of satisfaction in driving customers’ loyalty and complaint behavior. Our results indicate that firms must do more to ensure that managers understand how their customers perceive the firm’s products and services and why.     

New Economic Geography: An appraisal on the occasion of Paul Krugman's 2008 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

Paul Krugman has clarified the microeconomic underpinnings of both spatial economic agglomerations and regional imbalances at national and international levels. He has achieved this with a series of remarkably original papers and books that succeed in combining imperfect competition, increasing returns, and transportation costs in new and powerful ways. Yet, not everything was brand new in New Economic Geography. To be precise, several disparate pieces of high-quality work were available in urban economics and location theory. Our purpose in this paper is to shed new light on economic geography through the lenses of these two fields of economics and regional science.     

RESTORING THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM DIFFERENTIATION IN PRODUCT POSITIONING

Most research on product positioning supports the idea of differentiation. Product standardization (i.e., minimum differentiation) occurs only under very limiting assumptions. Yet, similar products are often observed in the marketplace. We attempt to restore the case for standardization by using more realistic assumptions than in previous work. We assume that consumers consider not only observable attributes in brand choice, but also attributes that are unobservable by the firms. We find that standardization is an equilibrium when consumers exhibit sufficient heterogeneity along the unobservable attributes under both positioning with exogenously given prices and price competition, We also show that, under insufficient heterogeneity along the unobservable attribute, our results coincide with past research that argues in favor of differentiation.     

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.     

Are market pioneers intrinsically stronger than later entrants?

Are market pioneers more successful because they started with superior skills and resources? The absolute pioneer advantage hypothesis is that because market pioneering is desirable, firms with superior skills and resources naturally choose to pioneer new markets. The comparative advantage hypothesis is that market evolution changes success requirements. Market pioneer skills and resources differ from, but are not superior to later entrants. Empirical results across 171 diversification entrants tend to support the comparative advantage hypothesis. Skill and resource profiles are provided for market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants.     

Pricing,distribution and the supply of storage

The Belgian nitrogen fertilizer cartel announces each year a price schedule which is enforced during the coming twelve months. These prices are resale prices to final users and reflect changes in costs of storage. A game-theoretic model is set up to rationalize this behavior for the case of instantaneous final demands and a large number of distributors. Habit formation in final demand is then shown to lead to even more flexible prices, while transferability over time is seen to favor more rigid prices. It is finally suggested that vertical integration into a competitive distribution sector can be profitable because it restores the possibility of intertemporal price discrimination.     

Corporate consumer affairs departments — A communications perspective

As an increasing number of corporations, both in Europe and the United States, establish consumer affairs departments, it becomes important to define the role of these new organizational units in the relationship between consumers and business firms. The consumer affairs department provides the consumer with an opportunity to make his voice heard in management decision making, and business firms with an opportunity to develop a better understanding of consumer concerns.This paper aims at laying a first foundation for the understanding of the consumer affairs function within profit-seeking organizations that operate in essentially market-directed economies. Using a communications approach, it is attempted to show that the consumer affairs department can, if properly integrated within the corporate decision making structure, perform a valuable function as a consumer communications channel.

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Abteilungen für Verbraucherbelange in privaten Firmen

Zusammenfassung Mit ihrer Kritik an Produkten, Marketing und dem Unternehmertum insgesamt hat die Verbraucherbewegung auch viele Unzulänglichkeiten bei der Kommunikation auf Märkten aufgezeigt. Die Einflußmöglichkeiten für Verbraucher sind ziemlich eingeschränkt und ermöglichen in der Regel keinen unmittelbaren Dialog zwischen Unternehmensleitung und Verbraucher. Folglich sind die Möglichkeiten der Verbraucher sehr begrenzt, ihre Wünsche bei unternehmerischen Entscheidungen zur Geltung zu bringen. Einen Weg zur Überbrückung dieser Kommunikationslücke sehen Firmen darin, daß sie eine innerbetriebliche Abteilung für die Belange speziell von Verbrauchern einrichten. Diese Abteilung bietet dem Verbraucher die Gelegenheit, in ein Gespräch mit der Firma einzutreten und die Geschäftspolitik und Produktgestaltung zu beeinflussen.Mit der wachsenden Zahl von Firmen, die sowohl in Europa als auch in den Vereinigten Staaten solche Abteilungen für Verbraucherbelange einrichten, wird es wichtig, die Funktion dieser neuen Organisationseinheiten für die Beziehung zwischen Nachfragern und Anbietern klarzulegen. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, erste Grundlagen für das Verständnis von Verbraucherabteilungen innerhalb gewinnorientierter Unternehmungen zu legen. Er versucht zu zeigen, daß solche Abteilungen eine wertvolle Aufgabe als Kommunikationsweg für Verbraucher erfüllen können — vorausgesetzt, sie sind angemessen in die Entscheidungsstruktur der Unternehmung integriert.

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Claes Fornell is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Nathaniel Leverone Hall, Evanston, Illinois 60201, USA.