Why the Generalized Bass Model leads to odd optimal advertising policies

We show that the optimal advertising strategy under the Generalized Bass Model (GBM) involves beginning at an extremely low level (the lower the better) and then increasing spending throughout the planning period. This strategy remains optimal in the presence of decreasing prices that affect both margins and diffusion speed. We provide a simple explanation for why this happens. We further show that the intuitively appealing patterns of continuous decrease or increase-then-decrease (both with an uptick towards the end) identified in earlier research are also possible as optimal dynamic advertising paths under the GBM structure, but only if the advertising at launch is constrained to be higher than a particular threshold, which we identify. The constraint necessary to generate intuitively appealing strategies lowers overall profits. Therefore, the GBM generates advertising policy recommendations that most marketers would deem odd. This casts doubt on the value of the GBM for normative purposes. Other existing diffusion models are preferred when seeking normative guidance on optimal dynamic advertising policies for new products subject to word of mouth.     

Predicting product life cycle patterns

In this paper, we propose a new model of adoption and repurchase due to upgrades driven by the utility of technology products that keep improving. The model is able to predict product life cycle patterns that could not be explained previously. Such patterns were used to challenge diffusion theory validity. Mathematically, the model is described as a nonlinear discrete system that depends on a small set of parameters. We investigate the dynamic properties of the nonlinear system using numerical stability analysis. We find domains in the parameters space in which the equilibrium point and the periodical orbits are stable. The domains correspond to population heterogeneity, tendency to upgrade, and the influence of industry response on market dynamics. We also implement our model to fit actual data of two real-world product life cycles with many irregularities and benchmark the results of our model vs. well-known models.     

Mortality salience – shedding light on the dark experience

ABSTRACT

Mortality salience, a key term in Terror Management Theory, refers to self-awareness of one’s vulnerability and ultimate mortality. This exploratory study, based on psychology and tourism literature, clarifies the degree to which a visit to a heritage site of death and atrocities evokes mortality salience as well as the relationship between mortality salience and various dimensions of the visit experience. The findings indicate that not only was mortality salience evoked during the visit, it is also an important component in understanding the motivation to visit dark sites, the emotional experience of the visit, and the impact of the visit on visitors. We therefore propose that the conceptualization and management of a death-centered heritage site can be enriched by the integration of sense of mortality salience. Additionally, the high Cronbach’s alpha suggests that the study can provide an initial basis for a scale to quantitatively measure Mortality Salience.     

Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public “bad” economies

Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the large finite economies with pure public bad commodities. Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions. Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz     

Congestion tolls and parking fees: A comparison of the potential effect on travel behavior

This paper presents a comparison of attitudes towards congestion and parking tolls and explores their effect on travel behavior. The findings indicate that drivers are sensitive mainly to congestion tolls and are willing to change their travel habits to avoid these tolls. The major effect of a congestion toll is the shifting of the time of the journey. High levels of demand elasticity (−1.8 for congestion tolls and −1.2 for parking fees) were found. The readiness to pay parking fees is greater; thus, the effectiveness of congestion tolls in reducing demand is higher during the times the tolls apply.     

Management contribution and the allocation of time in a labor-managed firm

The problem of time allocation in a labor-managed firm is considered under a technology specification in which the role of management in the production process is different from that of “ordinary” members. Two allocation schemes are discussed, the egalitarian and the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that in the model discussed the Nash solution brings about an output level that is lower than the Pareto-optimal output level. If the manager seeks employment opportunities outside the cooperative that reflect his success as manager, he increases his time input so that the output of the cooperative and the “ordinary” members' utility levels increase.     

Bonding and Bridging Associational Social Capital and the Financial Performance of Local Authorities in Israel

Abstract

This study explores whether bridging and bonding social capital differ in their impacts on government performance at the local level and the extent to which these impacts vary between localities exhibiting differing socioeconomic resources. The study is based on an analysis of 256 local authorities in Israel. The findings show that bridging and bonding social capital do differ in their respective effects on government performance and that the nature of the relationship of each type of capital with government performance varies by the community's socioeconomic profile. Poor communities with high densities of bridging social capital were characterized by lower deficits as a percentage of total municipal budgets, more accurate expenditure forecasts and greater spending on services per capita.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.