Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition

This contribution investigates fiscal coordination in the framework of two countries asymmetric in respect of their capital–labor endowment. When tax policies are decided by majority voting inside each country, and they are not coordinated at a supranational level, factors of production are inefficiently allocated, at equilibrium. Our main result shows that fiscal coordination, via a minimum capital tax, does not always lead to a Pareto–improvement for the median voter's welfare, with respect to the noncooperative outcome.     

Introduction to the special issue

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination -     

Taxing Market Power

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing bilateral oligopoly situations, which constitute particular examples of Shapley–Shubik strategic market games.     

Predicting consumers’ cheating behavior. The role of mental representation of goods and psychological ownership

This study examines the likelihood of cheating when consumers are offered with the option of using postponed payment plans after purchasing hedonic goods. It addresses how the nature of the good combined with payment timing affects its perceived psychological ownership, which in turn influences consumers’ cheating behavior. Three experimental studies indicate that when consumers mentally represent a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) good, they are more likely to cheat. This effect is greater with a postponed payment than with an immediate one. Findings also show that perceived psychological ownership is lower for hedonic goods and this explains different levels of cheating behavior. The paper offers managerial guidance on how to increase perceived psychological ownership for hedonic goods, with the goal of reducing cheating behavior.     

Information dissemination in an experimentally based agent-based stock market

This paper builds an agent-based model to reproduce the results of an experimental stock market that studies how the market aggregates private information. The aim is to use experiments and agent-based modeling to analyze the trading behavior in experimental stock markets. Using the experimental environment and results, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis about the subjects’ behavior and thereby formalize (algorithmically) the trading behavior in an agent-based model. This may lead to a better understanding of how the market converges to an equilibrium and of the mechanism that allows dissemination of private information in the market.     

Federalism with Bicameralism

We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.     

A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

This note shows that per unit taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation in an oligopoly model, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high compared to the number of oligopolists. It aims to provide an alternative perspective to existing literature arguing instead the dominance of ad valorem over per unit taxation in oligopoly frameworks. Our result is obtained in a simple example which uses a strategic market game formulation to study strategic behavior at a general equilibrium level.     

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions     

Loss or gain? The role of message framing in hotel guests’ recycling behaviour

Abstract

One of the major challenges for the tourism sector is enacting sustainable behaviours. A key strategy for hoteliers is developing persuasive messages, with the goal of encouraging guests’ voluntary participation in green programmes. Through the lens of prospect theory and construal level theory, the present study investigates to what extent a loss or gain-framed message influences recycling of hotel guests via a field and a laboratory experiment. The field experiment tests the moderating effect of message construal level (concrete or abstract) on the message frame that activate pro-environmental behaviour, while the laboratory study delves further into the mechanism by showing that perceived self-efficacy is the mechanism behind the activation of these behaviours. The findings from both studies suggest that hotel guests are more likely to engage in recycling behaviour when a concrete message is paired with a loss-framed message, because of a greater perceived self-efficacy. These results help to understand the theoretical psychological mechanisms and offer managerial implications for operators on how to engage guests to be active partners in sustainable tourism behaviours.     

Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system

We analyse voting on the devolution of the responsibilities for the provision of public goods to local governments in a federal country, with a bicameral national legislature. In our set-up, devolution means a constitutional fiscal reform which reduces federal public expenditure on a local public good, and simultaneously increases the transfers received by regions, via a tax-sharing mechanism. This allows the regions to provide a greater amount of a local public good which can compensate for the reduction of that provided upon a federal basis. We show under which conditions such a devolution reform is adopted or rejected.