Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

REAL OPTIONS AND THE CROSS‐SECTION OF EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS

This paper surveys the theoretical literature investigating the effect of firms’ investment flexibility on the cross‐section of expected stock returns. Real options analysis derives firms’ value‐maximizing investment policies as functions of exogenous fundamental drivers of profitability and calculates firms’ market values as functions of the same variables. These functions yield the relationship between expected stock returns and firm fundamentals. Several plausible explanations for the value premium – the high average stock returns earned by firms with high book‐to‐market ratios – emerge from this literature.     

The tortoise and the hare: the impact of employment instability on firm performance

The main objective of this study is to assess the influence of employment instability on firm performance in a sample of publicly traded firms. Competing theoretical arguments are considered with regard to likely outcomes associated with employment instability. A large sample of cross‐sectional time‐series data is then analysed using generalised estimating equations (GEE) regression techniques. Results indicate that employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance, although the relationship is also demonstrated to be quadratic (an inverse U‐shaped relationship). This suggests that the main relationship varies depending upon the level of employment instability. Industry characteristics are also examined as moderators of this main effect. The results suggest a disordinal interaction effect for industry differentiation, where employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance for firms in highly differentiated industries and positively associated in less differentiated industries.     

Management practices in Australasian ethical investment products: a role for regulation?

This paper adds to the literatures on socially responsible investment (SRI), investment management, regulation of financial services and social accounting by providing a comprehensive survey of investment methods used in SRI products and regulated social reporting in financial services. Australian and New Zealand regulations require issuers of self‐declarative SRI products to provide details on methods used in portfolio construction. Regulators' objectives to standardize the reporting of portfolio construction and thus improve its comparability were identified by examination of parliamentary debates and other public reports. Portfolio construction styles of 86 SRI products managed by 63 financial institutions in Australia and New Zealand were chosen for analysis. Statistical analysis was conducted to identify associations between styles, construction methods and assessment techniques over a four‐year period: 2004–2007. These aspects were further examined in 18 case studies. Over the period, diversity and intensity of construction methods had increased both within and between investment managers. The non‐standard nature of management consultation used in SRI products, marketing needs to distinguish rather than standardize investment methods and the types of information thought relevant to clients did not reconcile easily with the types of information required by regulation. The more recent products in the sample tended to reference market indexes in portfolio construction, separate social considerations from financial considerations and delegate qualitative assessments of invested companies. Consumer policy implications arise from questions bearing on the integrity of information attached to investment products and the effective monitoring of delegated investment processes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements.     

An Examination of Sales Promotion Programs in Hong Kong: What the Retailers Offer and What the Consumers Prefer

This study gives an insight into the retailer's capability of managing sales promotion by examining the sales promotion programs offered by Hong Kong cosmetic and toiletry retailers and the consumers’ preferences. The results indicate that instant-reward programs are popular among retailers and preferred by consumers. The results also show that the preferences for sales promotion programs are dependent upon consumers’ demographic and sociocultural characteristics. Implications for advertisers designing and communicating sales promotions are offered.     

The Campus Parking Game: A Demonstration of Price Discrimination and Efficiency

This article presents a classroom game that allows students to directly experience the welfare improvements that can result from price discrimination. The demonstration uses a very familiar decision-making scenario, campus parking, to introduce the concept of price discrimination as well as reinforce the concepts of opportunity cost, consumer surplus, and search costs. This game can be used in a variety of classes, including principles, intermediate theory, industrial organization, or environmental economics, and can be conducted in a 50-minute class period with follow-up discussion in the next class.     

The New Business of Government Budgeting: Reporting Non-Financial Performance Information in Victoria

Since the early 1990s the general and financial management of the Victorian public sector has been significantly transformed. This research examines and explains the content, nature and quality of non-financial disclosures, including those related to performance indicators, through a disclosure indicator analysis of reporting practices in recent government budget papers. It reports the results of its application to the last three years' budget papers. The findings highlight the problems in the reporting of non-financial performance indicators in the Victorian budget papers. These results indicate a significant gap between "official" expectations of the type of items required to be reported and actual budgetary reporting practices – some many years after regulation and major financial accountability reforms have taken place.     

Executive succession: Organizational antecedents of ceo characteristics

Based on 195 succession events in Business Week 1000 firms, this study examines the organizational antecedents of CEO demographic characteristics. Study findings suggest that antecedent conditions of lower firm profits and firm growth are associated with the selection of outsider CEOs. Additionally, R&D intensity is associated with the selection of CEOs having technical functional backgrounds and higher levels of education.     

Price‐cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment

This article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms’ investment behavior and welfare‐maximizing regulation of price and quantity. Regulated firms invest in smaller, more frequent, increments than social planners, with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale. Regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate, and at higher levels when they are substantial. When quantity is also regulated, the average cost of building capacity increases but the price cap decreases. Immediately after firms make their initial investment, regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap to induce additional investment.