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排序方式: 共有111条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Haim Ben Shahar 《The Journal of Finance》1970,25(3):678-681
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Haim Reisman 《Quantitative Finance》2013,13(2):317-322
The ‘law of one accounting variable’ is defined in this paper as an extension of ‘the law of one price’. It says roughly that if the future payoffs of two assets are the same (in every state of the world), then the accounting variable of the assets are approximately the same. The paper derives a condition under which this law holds and shows that when the law holds for some accounting variables, these variables can replace betas in the multibeta representation of asset returns, provided some admissibility conditions are satisfied. 相似文献
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We analyze the optimal portfolio policies of expected utility maximizing agents under VaR Capital Requirement (VaR-CR) regulation in comparison to the optimal policy under exogenously-imposed VaR Limit (VaR-L) and Limited-Expected-Loss (LEL) regulations. With VaR-CR regulation the agent strategy consists of simultaneous decisions on both the portfolio VaR and on the implied amount of required eligible capital. As a result, the performance of VaR-CR regulation depends on its design (the parameter n) and the agent preferences. We show that an optimal VaR-CR regulation allows the regulator on the one hand, to completely eliminate the exposure to the largest losses, which may jeopardize the existence of the institution, and on the other hand, to restrain the portfolio exposure to all other losses. These results rationalize the current Basel regulations. However, the analysis shows also that there is an optimal level of required eligible capital from the regulator standpoint. Counter-intuitively, any requirement above this optimal level is inefficient as it leads to a smaller amount of actually maintained eligible capital and thereby to a larger exposure to the most adverse states of the world. Unfortunately, the current Basel’s range of required levels (n = 3–4) is within this inefficient range. Moreover, with an inefficient regulation the agent might employ an inefficient reporting and disclosure procedure. 相似文献
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What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We study benefits received by target chief executive officers(CEOs) in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain targetCEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonusesor increased golden parachutes. These negotiated cash paymentsare positively associated with the CEO's prior excess compensationand negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomesan executive of the acquiring company. Regression estimatessuggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premiain transactions involving extraordinary personal treatment ofthe CEO. Target CEOs experience very high turnover rates bothat the time of acquisition and, for those who remain employed,for several years thereafter. 相似文献
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We argue that when individuals care about their consumption relative to that of their neighbours, a home bias emerges, that is investors overweight domestic stocks in their portfolios. Domestic stocks are preferred because they also serve the objective of mimicking the economic fortunes and welfare of the investor's neighbours, countrymen, and social reference group. We also demonstrate that globalization mitigates the home bias, and derive a modified international CAPM. 相似文献
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When financial statements are audited, a client and auditor may disagree about an accounting disclosure. While the disclosure of such a disagreement may increase the information content of a statement it may also be socially undesirable in that it signals a difference in views about the state of the reporting enterprise. This in turn may increase agency costs and introduce uncertainty about the state of the firm. In this paper we focus on public policy implications concerning auditor-client disagreements and examine the ex ante probability that such cases will occur. We find that accounting standards that allow two accounting options may be optimal in reducing frequency of disagreements among auditors and between standard-setters and their constituencies, and possibly also between clients and their auditors. The New Zealand model of compliance with accounting standards may be preferable to that practiced in the US. 相似文献
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Haim Mendelson 《Journal of Economic Theory》1985,37(2):254-280
This paper studies the behavior of a competitive exchange under uncertain preferences and random indivisible endowments. We obtain explicit closed-form results for the price distribution and expected gains from trade, both for case where the market is “thin” and the number of traders is low, and for the asymptotic case where the number of traders tends to infinity. We demonstrate that increasing the number of traders reduces price variability and increases the expected gains from trade, and that increasing the variability of traders' reservation prices increases price variability as well as the expected asymptotic gains from trade. 相似文献
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We model an incumbent’s decision to pursue radical or incremental innovation when facing a rival entrant. The radical innovation may yield lucrative financial returns but entails significant technological and market‐related uncertainties. It is also particularly attractive to the rival entrant: if the market for it pans out, such an innovation obsoletes the existing technology and any incremental improvements to it. Each firm has its own assessment of the market potential for the radical innovation, and the reliability of these market forecasts can differ. We show that when the entrant’s market‐assessment capability is weak, the incumbent will pursue incremental innovation and postpone its plans to develop radical innovation even when it thinks highly of the market potential for the radical innovation. The incumbent does so to avoid validating the high market potential to the entrant, who may otherwise be encouraged to invest aggressively. The incumbent thus prefers to look “soft” with respect to its innovation strategy in order to discourage entry. Even if its innovation strategy is not observable, we show that an incumbent that assesses the commercial potential for a radical innovation favorably may pursue an incremental path and communicate its plans publicly; this strategy serves to reduce entry by affecting the entrant’s beliefs about the market potential of the innovation. Finally, we extend the model to investigate the entrant’s decision to communicate its innovation intentions. We find that the entrant communicates its plans to aggressively pursue radical innovation only if the incumbent’s market‐assessment capabilities are strong. In doing so, the entrant acts preemptively to discourage the incumbent from pursuing the radical innovation, and is less concerned with validating market potential. 相似文献