The anticipated and concurring effects of the EMU: exchange rate volatility, institutions and growth

Reduced exchange rate volatility and higher and less heterogeneous quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies are two of the main (anticipated and concurring) effects expected from a currency union.In this paper, we measure the magnitude of these two effects for the Eurozone countries looking at real effective exchange rates (REER) and at different indicators of quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies (QIRMP). We find that the first effect is much stronger than the second when we compare relative changes for Eurozone countries and the rest of the world in the relevant period.We further evaluate the impact of both effects on economic growth on a larger sample of countries. Our findings show that both have significant impact on levels (more robust) and on rates of growth (weaker) of per capita GDP.     

A New Approach to Currency Depreciation

Currency depreciation has been studied conventionally in terms of three hypotheses—the elasticities approach, the monetary approach and the absorption approach. In this paper we offer another hypothesis called the price approach, wherein the balance of payment disequilibrium results from an inappropriate price level. Specifically, a country has a trade surplus if the equilibrium price level is below that compatible with balanced trade; by contrast, it has a trade deficit if the price level is above that compatible with balanced trade. We illustrate the price approach with the experience of currency devaluations that have occurred in emerging markets since 1997.     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.     

The causal relation between government revenue and spending: Evidence from Egypt and Jordan

In investigating the causal relation between government revenue and spending, our empirical results support the tax-and-spend hypothesis for Egypt and the fiscal synchronization hypothesis for Jordan. Breaking away from these historical trends is essential for both countries to eliminate the budget deficit and therefore ensure the availability of domestic saving for private investment. To cope with unemployment and poverty, continuing privatization is recommended for both countries to improve productivity and efficiency in the domestic economy. Privatization should lead to higher domestic saving and investment and at the same time eliminate the budget deficit by enhancing revenue and curbing spending. (JEL H62, H63)     

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome.     

The impact of (more) enlargement on the European Employment Strategy

The European Union (EU) aspires to be the most competitive, full employment economy in the world and has set a number of ambitious targets to be met by 2010 in order that it can achieve this goal. At the same time, it is pursuing an enlargement policy that will witness the accession of an increasing number of less developed nations. This article explores some of the tensions that exist between these two goals as these are manifest in labour market indicators and finds the likelihood of meeting the deadline set for success remote.     

Development and efficiency of the banking sector in a transitional economy: Hungarian experience

The paper analyzes the experiences and developments of Hungarian banking sector during the transitional process from a centralized economy to a market-oriented system. The paper identifies that early reorganization initiatives, flexible approaches to privatization, and liberal policies towards foreign banks’ involvement with the domestic institutions helped to build a relatively stable and increasingly efficient banking system. Foreign banks and banks with higher foreign bank ownership involvement were associated with lower inefficiency.     

Fair value disclosures and crash risk

In response to the public criticism of the inadequate disclosures mandated by SFAS No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, the FASB issued ASU (Accounting Standards Update) 2010–06, Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements, and ASU 2011–04, Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements, in an effort to increase the reporting transparency. We examine whether the increased fair value disclosures required by these two updates effectively decrease crash risk, defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. In support of the hypothesis, we find that increased transparency from these updates reduces crash risk among U.S. banking firms and that the reduction is greater in banks that have a higher level of Level 3 financial assets.     

BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.