Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power

We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms .     

Price and market policy for agriculture

The focus of this policy assessment is on the recent history of regulatory measures in market-oriented economies where the dominating triad of problems is stablisation, farm income support and market surplusses. Alternative forms of intervention are reviewed with respect to their impact on domestic supply and demand, international trade, farm income and labour, and finally how they cope with the process of change in agriculture. The author concludes that stabilisation policies in agriculture are not suitable for perishables where they can easily become a burden for consumers and governments alike.     

Rational exuberance

We study a two-player investment game with information externalities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique symmetric switching equilibrium are provided. When public news indicates that the investment opportunity is very profitable, too many types are investing early and investments should therefore be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.     

On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration.     

Rural development and financial markets in Romania

In the transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, such as in Romania, the domestic financial market plays two important roles. First, the financial market itself must be fundamentally restructured. Second, its efficient functioning is a crucial precondition for economic transformation. In transition economies, however, financial market institutions tend to concentrate their services on urban or larger rural enterprises. So far, small rural enterprises, even those with profitable investment plans, often do not have access to the financial market. This paper briefly characterizes the key issues of agricultural production units and their institutional environment and analyzes the depth and the efficiency of rural finance and its effect on Romania's rural economic transformation. It concludes with policy and institutional recommendations to strengthen rural finance.     

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction

This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price.     

Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects

Summary. We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects, which arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects. Formally, cohort effects lead to intra-period network effects being greater than inter-period network effects. Depending on the nature of the cohort effects, our game may or may not satisfy dynamic increasing differences. If it does, our model has a unique rationalizable outcome. Otherwise, multiple equilibria may exist as players want to invest at the same point in time others do.Received: 13 July 2004, Revised: 20 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82, D83.We thank George-Marios Angeletos, Helmut Bester, Andreas Blume, Estelle Cantillon, Frank Heinemann, Christian Hellwig, Larry Karp, Tobias Kretschmer, In Ho Lee, Robin Mason and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the EEA-meeting in Stockholm 2003, ESRC Workshop in Warwick 2004, Free University Berlin, IAE (Barcelona), Keele, MIT, Southampton, University of Pittsburgh, and at a CEPR-conference in Brussels 2002 for comments, and the European Union for providing financial support through the TMR network on network industries (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203). This paper was completed while the first author visited the Department of Economics at MIT, whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges.     

Private monitoring in auctions

We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories. Our main result is the construction of EPBEa that improve upon bid rotation. Assuming symmetry, the exclusionary schemes of Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [Tacit collusion in repeated auctions, J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004), 153–169], including asymptotically efficient ones, are supported as EPBEa.     

Participatory Product Design by Using Conjoint Analysis in the Rural Financial Market of Northern Vietnam

Analyzing secondary and primary data (collected in 2001–2002), this paper suggests a shift in national development policies from solely promoting rural credit to supporting local savings activities. The household data (N = 260) are econometrically analyzed applying conjoint analysis (CA) methodology. The CA gave valuable insights into how to improve outreach of formal financial institutes (FFIs) by adapting the credit products to client preferences and revealed an un-attended demand for savings instruments. Due to the enormous credit outreach of the FFIs in Vietnam, it would be more efficient to launch a credit consolidation policy and to implement a reliable and sustainable deposit collection system at the village level. However, within national policymaking, a paradigm change must take place and the capability of rural households to save needs to be recognized by policy-makers.     

Land titling policy and soil conservation in the northern uplands of Vietnam

In Vietnam, a quasi-private property regime has been established in 1993 with the issuance of exchangeable and mortgageable long-term land use right certificates. Using primary qualitative and quantitative data collected in a mountainous district of Northern Vietnam, this paper investigates the role of the land policy in the adoption of soil conservation technologies by farmers. This issue is of crucial importance in the region where population growth and growing market demands have induced farmers to intensify agricultural production. While poverty has been reduced, environmental problems such as soil erosion, landslides, and declining soil fertility have become more severe over the past years. Our findings suggest that despite farmers’ awareness of erosion, soil conservation technologies are perceived as being economically unattractive; therefore, most upland farmers continue to practice the prevailing erosion-prone cultivation system. Focusing on agroforestry as one major soil conservation option, we estimate household and plot-level econometric models to empirically assess the determinants of adoption. We find that the possession of a formal land title positively influences adoption, but that the threat of land reallocations in villages discourages adoption by creating uncertainty and tenure insecurity. The analyses reveal that these two effects interact with each other but are of small magnitude. We conclude that the issuance of land titles is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite to encouraging the adoption of soil conservation practices. However, current practices remain economically unattractive to farmers. This deficiency needs to be addressed by interdisciplinary research and complemented by strong efforts by local authorities to promote sustainable land use.