Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments

We show that asymmetric information may prevent firms with pure discount bonds from renegotiating their capital structure prior to the maturity of the debt, although this would increase the value of the firm when its prospects are poor. This inefficiency can be reduced if the firm issues debt with a risky intermediate debt payment, such as a coupon or a sinking fund payment. We also demonstrate that bankruptcy institutions leading to deviations from absolute priority can improve the timing of recapitalizations by financially distressed firms. Finally, we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal capital structure adjustment during financial distress consists of a convertible debt-for-straight debt swap.     

Asymmetric information and a theory of compensating balances

This paper derives an economic justification for the existence of compensating balance requirements using an equilibrium model of asymmetric information. Because bank profitability depends upon the probability distribution of a borrower's future cash requirements, and assuming this distribution is known by the borrower but not by the bank, compensating balance requirements can be used by the bank as a screen to distinguish among borrowers. Compensating balances are shown to exist without invoking assumptions of monopoly banks or non-maximizing behavior, and these balances need not be explained as a method of indirect payment for bank services.     

Corporate social responsibility,stock prices,and tax policy

We model a market in which some investors get utility from owning shares of firms that engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In equilibrium, investors' CSR considerations influence portfolio choices, stock prices, and CSR spending. We study tax policy designed to maximize total giving (individual and corporate) net of government tax breaks and find that its effectiveness is non‐monotonic in the proportion of altruistic investors: with few or many altruistic investors, it has little impact on giving, but, at intermediate levels, effective tax policy intuitively relates the corporate tax rebate rate on giving and the cap on allowable tax savings.     

Asymmetric information and the medium of exchange in takeovers: theory and tests

In a model of takeovers under asymmetric information, we identifya separating equilibrium in which the value of the bidder firmis revealed by the mix of cash and securities used as paymentfor the target. The model predicts that the revealed biddervalue is monotonically increasing and convex in the fractionof the total offer that consists of cash. We examine the modelrestrictions using data from Canada, where mixed offers areboth relatively frequent and free of the confounding tax-relatedoptions characterizing mixed offers in the United States. Wefind that the average announcement-month bidder abnormal returnin mixed offers is large and significant. However, maximum likelihoodestimates of parameters in both linear and nonlinear cross-sectionalregressions fail to support the model predictions.     

Reputation and Managerial Truth-Telling as Self-Insurance

We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider cannot trade on or sell private information, but faces imperfectly hedgeable nonwage income shocks. When compensation depends on the current stock price, a partially revealing equilibrium may exist in which the manager manipulates his reports, and hence the stock price, to reduce consumption variance. Intuitively, the manager builds reputation in good times when honesty is affordable, and exploits reputation in times of need. Endogenous reputation for honesty thus follows from a self-insurance motive.     

The dynamics of portfolio management contracts

We consider the multiperiod relationship between a client anda portfolio manager and the resulting problem of motivatinga manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information.We explore the contractual form and the optimal retention policyof the client and find that the optimal initial set of contractsfeatures a smaller performance based fee component paid to themanager than in a first-best contract, and the contract choiceelicits only partial information about the manager. As a result,ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting.In general, managers are retained only if the returns on theirportfolio exceed the benchmark by an appropriate amount.     

Corporate Decisions,Information and Prices: Do Managers Move Prices or Do Prices Move Managers?

Seasoned equity offerings involve two significant events: registration followed by the decision to complete the issue or withdraw the registration. We present an empirical analysis of the interaction between seasoned equity issues, insider trading and the incorporation of information in prices around these two events. We find that the manager moves prices through corporate decisions but not personal ones. Specifically, the market reacts to the registration and the registration triggers information acquisition by the market, which is shown to influence the manager's final decision. Trading by managers during this interval does not, however, move prices.
(J.E.L.: G14, G23, G32) .