Nash equilibrium reconsidered and an option for maximin

In this paper we will discuss some peculiarities of the Nash equilibrium which are at odds with its standard applications: (a) the underlying dynamic interpretation, (b) the incentive independency if equilibria are mixed, and (c) the unprofitability if equilibrium and maximin are mixed and the game is 2-by-2. Maximin is proposed as an alternative solution concept in “relevant situations”.     

An indifference trap of voting

In this paper strategic situations of voting and abstentions are analysed in a three-candidate voting model where voters are indifferent to various alternatives and candidates are interested in winning the election and seeing their most preferred alternative being realized. A specific decision problem is analysed, described by an Indifference Trap Game, with respect to, e.g., the corresponding Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, and maximin solution. A second-best outcome is contained in the choice set of all three solutions while the Nash equilibrium concept is compatible with the Pareto efficient outcomes of the game.An alternative scenario where candidates suffer from incumbency but voters still are indifferent to some alternatives also supports the second-best outcome. Again, various solutions concepts are applied. We conclude that indifferent voters imply an eminent coordination problem for the candidates in the given voting game which, in general, ends up in inefficient outcomes. The inherent complexity of the decision situation cannot be sufficiently reduced to single out one and only one outcome.     

Selbstregulation, Regulationsfokus und Arbeitsmotivation

Zusammenfassung Die Bedeutung der Selbstregulation für die Arbeitsmotivation und -leistung ist unumstritten. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Selbstregulation, mit dem Regulationsfokus auf Promotion oder Prävention und der Passung zwischen Regulationsfokus und Arbeitsauftrag und -anforderungen. Die Übereinstimmung zwischen der Art der Selbstregulation einer Person und der aktuellen Situation hat positive Konsequenzen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Arbeitszufriedenheit. Auch die Effizienz von Feedback über Arbeitsschritte und -leistungen sowie der Erfolg von Programmen zur Förderung eines gesunden Lebensstils hängen vom Regulationsfokus des Empfängers der Botschaft ab. In der Mitarbeiterführung und Arbeitsgestaltung können die Berücksichtigung des Regulationsfokus einer Person, eine entsprechende Aufgabenformulierung und die adäquate Rückmeldung über die Arbeitsleistung positive Effekte auf Motivation und Leistung haben. JEL classifications M12, M54     

Supply-side strategic unemployment in small business

In this paper, the model which will be analysed is characterized by a labour market with (a) profitable vacancies, (b) unemployment, (c) excess labour supply, (d) limited mobility and divisibility of labour, and (e) competition on-the-job. The analysed setting is typical for a small-business economy. The analysis suggests that unemployment will be greater than equilibrium unemployment if present employees and potential entrants consider job assignments for this market under strategic perspectives.     

Randomized decision rules in voting games: a model for strict proportional power

The concept of strict proportional power is introduced, as a means of formalizing a desire to avoid discrepancy between the seat distribution in a voting body and the actual voting power in that body, as measured by power indices in common use. Proportionality is obtained through use of a randomized decision rule (majority rule). Some technical problems which arise are discussed in terms of simplex geometry. Practical implications and problems in connection with randomized decision rules are indicated.     

Abstracts

Quality & Quantity -     

Two concepts of monotonicity in two-person bargaining theory

Monotonicity has been suggested as a principle of fairness and a principle of bargaining. It has been proposed as a substitute to the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” axiom in bargaining solutions and thus applied to the determination of wages and employment. In this paper we will discuss the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and show that it does not correspond to the monotonicity notion which follows from the “principle of bargaining” idea.