Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

ACTIVITY SELECTION UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK AND INSTABILITY: CONSIDERATION OF FREQUENCY

The terms ‘instability’ and ‘risk’ are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. Some make the argument that instability will shift the firm's supply curve to the left if the producer is risk-averse Risk, however, is associated with the unpredictable residuals, or deviations from the producer's revenue expectations. The inherent instability of these returns does not necessarily imply an added exposure to risk as long as the producer forms his expectations based on the entire information set available to him when constructing the mathematical model representing his judgement on the variables' future behaviour. The producer may also respond to the relative instability of the returns generated by an enterprise even if risk, as defined above, is perceived to be non-existent. The existence of prediction errors exposes the producer to conditions of choice under risk while the predictable component exposes the producer to conditions of choice under instability. His preferences with regard to risk and instability may be quite different. The purpose of this paper is to extend the traditional planning model under risk to account for the producer's attitude toward the predicted instability of returns over time, and to illustrate the effect that this attitude will have upon his production plans.     

The Impact of Denial-of-Service Attack Announcements on the Market Value of Firms

The increase in security breaches in the last few years and the need to insure information assets has created an intensified interest in information risk within organizations and for insurance companies. Risk assessment is an important component in the establishment of security policies. However, very little is known of the financial impact and the risk associated with security breaches. This article reports the impact of Denial‐of‐Service (DOS) attack announcements on the market over a period of 4.5 years. The study was conducted using event study methodology. The results show that in general the market does not penalize companies that experience such an attack. However, there is an indication that the market penalizes “Internet‐specific” companies more than other companies. Our results indicate that large companies who are not “Internet‐specific” might be overreacting to the media hype and may be investing resources to prevent a problem that has marginal impact on their shareholder value.