Company–Nonprofit Partnerships,Negative Spillover,and Response Strategies

This study explored whether, in the context of a company–nonprofit partnership, there are negative spillover effects when a crisis strikes a partner organization and what effective response strategies to such a crisis would be for the principal organization. We conducted an online experiment (N = 445) with a 2 (duration of partnership: long-term vs. short-term) × 4 (response strategy: denial, ending partnership, continuing partnership, vs. no response) between-subject design, with two no-crisis control groups. The results confirmed the existence of negative spillover effects; when respondents were exposed to crisis information about a partner organization, their attitude toward the principal organization became less favorable. We found that, regardless of the partnership’s duration, announcing a decision about the partnership—either ending the partnership or continuing the partnership—was not effective in restoring the principal organization’s image. Denial strategies, however, significantly improved the image of the principal organization, up to its precrisis level. We discuss the practical and theoretical implications.     

Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education?

This paper accounts simply for the link between higher education and the productive economy through educated workers. We study a model of vertical successive monopolies where students/workers acquire qualification from a University then “sell” skilled labor to a monopoly which itself sells its final product to consumers, linking through quality the education sector to the labor and output markets. We determine the optimal share the State should keep in the University to compensate for the market imperfections, while taking into account the inefficiencies of public management. The resulting partially privatized University fixes the tuition fees so as to maximize a weighted sum of profits and social welfare. We derive the optimal public share under the hypothesis that the State may subsidize the tuition fees/University losses, then under the constraint that the University should make a nonnegative profit. We prove that in both cases, the State should keep a substantial share (higher under the first hypothesis) in the University, unless public management is too inefficient in which case the University's management should be completely private.     

Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments.     

Finiteness property with vertical and horizontal differentiation: does it really matter?

The paper proves the consistency of vertical and horizontal differentiation models regarding the finiteness property. In the case of constant returns, it turns out that the attitude of consumers towards products sold at marginal costs is crucial for the finiteness property to hold or not. We first prove concerning the finiteness property results with horizontal preferences consistent with results already obtained with vertical preferences. Second we prove with vertical and horizontal preferences, a new type of result relative to the existing literature: the existence of an indifferent consumer and a population unanimous w.r.t. their most preferred variant when all variants are sold at marginal cost, is sufficient to allow to an unbounded number of firms to be active. In the case of non-constant returns, it is the cost structure in a neighborhood of the zero output that drives the market structure. Results consistent with results already proved with vertical preferences, are proved with horizontal preferences. Finally, existence results with horizontal preferences are provided to show that the demonstrated properties have cases of application.     

Natural Oligopolies: A Vertical Differentiation Model

This article contains a more complete characterization of conditions under which vertically differentiated markets are or are not natural oligopolies than has been found previously in the literature. Specifically, previous results on markets in which firms have cost functions with constant returns are incomplete; these results are expanded. Moreover, results are provided for markets with firms having increasing or decreasing marginal cost functions.     

Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.     

Differentiation,labor market and globalization

We consider two countries with initially one firm in each country and the possibility for each firm to invest in the other country or commercialize its products, and for workers to immigrate (Common Labor Market; CLM). Interestingly, when firms compete on the product market with no competition on the labor market (Goods’ Mobility; GM), they do not differentiate their qualities. However, when competition is introduced in both markets (Foreign Investment; FI) firms differentiate their products. We compare the globalization scenarii and prove that they improve the global social welfare relative to autarky and that a cooperative choice by countries of a globalization scenario would lead to GM.