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1.
Abstract. We investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time. The model is a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) . Identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is known only to potential sellers, enter the market over time. We show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry. Market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade. The model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations. JEL classification: D82 A propos des marchés de biens durables quand il y a entrée de nouveaux commerçants et sélection adverse. Les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendrés par le mécanisme dynamique des prix dans un marché concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a sélection adverse et entrée exogène de nouveaux commerçants dans le temps. Ce modèle est une version dynamique du modèle d’ Akerlof (1970) . Des cohortes identiques de biens durables, dont la qualité est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels, arrivent sur le marché dans le temps. Il semble qu’il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prévu par un modèle statique. En particulier, on montre qu’il existe un équilibre cyclique où tous les biens sont transigés à l’intérieur d’un nombre fini de périodes après leur arrivage et que, à chaque phase du cycle, l’éventail de qualité des biens transigés s’accroît. Les commerçants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualité attendent plus longtemps et l’imperfection du marché se traduit par la longueur de temps d’attente avant la transaction. Le modèle fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marché. 相似文献
2.
Entrepreneurship and Unemployment in the UK 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Roy Thurik 《Scottish journal of political economy》2003,50(3):264-290
The influence of industrial structure, more specifically of entrepreneurship, is investigated on the level of unemployment in the UK. The question is to what extent entrepreneurship, i.e., business ownership can reduce the level of unemployment. The alleged differences between the managed and the entrepreneurial economy will be discussed as well as the links between entrepreneurship and unemployment. It will be concluded that the UK is a relative outlier when using a simple model of the relationship between unemployment and the rate of business ownership. The model is calibrated using recent data of some 23 OECD countries. It underestimates the decrease in unemployment in the UK in the period 1982–1990. Some arguments are brought forward why this might be the case. 相似文献
3.
We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms. 相似文献
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Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
7.
Richard?BaronEmail author Jacques?Durieu Hans?Haller Philippe?Solal 《Economic Theory》2004,23(2):445-454 (2004)
Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author. 相似文献
8.
We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility face an idiosyncratic private access cost and must also contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is uniformly spread over the real line, the cost of a facility is independent of location and access costs are linear in distance, the Rawlsian access pricing is the unique cost sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness. The latter amounts to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own. 相似文献
9.
Abstract . An empirical analysis of the property crimes, robbery, burglary and larceny, is presented for all 120 counties in Kentucky. While this analysis is based on an economic model of crime, certain sociological and legal variables are included as well in the system of equations. Overall, the empirical results support prior studies’findings with the exception that a quadratic relationship is found to exist between urbanization and each of the property crimes. Furthermore, neither the economic nor the non economic influences measured appear more important for affecting crime rates. Specifically, results indicate that the level of poverty, the degree of tourism, the presence of police, the unemployment rate and the apprehension rate all affect property crimes. In contrast, the length of sentence, the degree of industrialization, the level of public assistance payments and the proportion of youth in the county have no affect on property crime rates in these areas. 相似文献
10.